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Executive Summary (ES-0A-2008) 
 
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLANNING: 
ETHICAL ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
TO THE INDIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
 
As of June 2008, 15 nations have reported cases of H5N1 infections, and 12 have 
reported fatalities.  With many experts believing that the world is overdue for an 
influenza pandemic and that H5N1 has pandemic potential, national, state, and local 
governments have been in the process of developing strategies to confront this issue.  In 
order to ensure that any such policy is acceptable to healthcare professionals and the 
public alike, ethical considerations must be taken into account. 
In August of 2007, the Indiana University Center for Bioethics (IUCB) presented 
to the Indiana State Department of Health (ISDH) a set of technical advisory documents 
(TADs) addressing ethical issues that may arise in the event of an influenza pandemic.  
The topics of altered standards of care, triage, vaccine allocation, and healthcare 
workforce management all were addressed in these documents, each with its own 
annotated bibliography.  Additionally, IUCB provided to ISDH an ethical framework 
entitled Points to Consider, which consisted of a set of seven ethical points that the 
Center believed the State should take into consideration when developing policies and 
procedures related to pandemic influenza response.  Since that time, ethicists, 
researchers, and policymakers have continued to contribute to the literature and develop 
policies addressing ethical pandemic influenza planning.  As a result, ISDH again 
contracted with IUCB to update the previous documents with the most current thinking 
on the respective topics. 
In addition to including a review of the most recent literature in the updated 
technical advisory documents, IUCB made two further changes to TAD development 
process.  First, the Center convened expert panels consisting of healthcare professionals, 
legal professionals, and other community members to review each of the TADs. 1 Based 
on the panel members’ feedback, IUCB revised its recommendations and included 
 
1 A report on the use of the expert panels is available under a separate cover.  
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discussions on any concerns panel members expressed.  The second change in the 
documents is the addition of case studies, which are reflective of the issues presented in 
the TADs and are intended to portray real world ethical dilemmas that may arise during 
an influenza pandemic.  The solutions to these case studies are based on the 
recommendations provided and are presented at the conclusion of each TAD.  It should 
be noted that the case studies may be applicable to several of the areas addressed in the 
four TADs, as the topics frequently overlap. 
The following is an overview of the TADs.  Further clarification of the 
recommendations and expert panel feedback are available in the respective documents. 
 
Altered Standards of Care.  Issues include the use of alternate care sites, maintaining 
adequate staffing, and alteration of documentation standards.  Five recommendations are 
proposed: 
1) The State should develop a protocol for altered standards of care that 
would take effect upon the declaration of the Governor and include legal 
protections for healthcare providers. 
2) The State should engage owners/administrators of all healthcare facilities 
in discussions about the impact of a statewide protocol for altered 
standards of care, including the selection of alternate care sites.  Efforts 
should be made to agree to these site acquisitions by consensus and 
partnership. 
3) The State should design, develop, and maintain a database of healthcare 
workers and encourage all healthcare institutions to identify potential 
healthcare workers and their skills and qualifications and register them 
into this database prior to a pandemic. 
4) The State should ensure that a comprehensive program is developed and 
implemented to provide all healthcare workers with adequate training 
and information regarding pandemic influenza and their anticipated 
responsibilities. 
5) The State should provide guidance on developing minimal standards for 
modified documentation procedures that can be implemented efficiently 
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at the time of a pandemic for all healthcare institutions, mortuaries, and 
other relevant organizations. 
Triage.  The primary issue presented is whether age, social role, and social worth should 
be included in triage decision-making.  The recommendations are: 
1) ISDH should adopt a protocol that rejects the consideration of social role 
and age as triage inclusion and exclusion criteria in favor of a system of 
allocation based solely on physiological prognosis.  This triage protocol 
should be applied to all acute care patients. 
2) ISDH should encourage all acute care facilities to adopt a common 
procedure for addressing how to allocate scarce resources when two (or 
more) patients arrive at an acute care facility with identical prognoses 
and there are insufficient resources to treat all. 
3) The State should advise all acute care facilities to adopt a common 
procedure to conduct a daily retrospective review of all triage decisions 
made during a pandemic in order to identify areas of the protocol in need 
of improvement. 
Vaccine and Antiviral Allocation.  The primary issue regarding this topic centers on how 
prioritization decisions should be made if there are insufficient supplies of vaccines and 
antivirals to meet the demand of the populations.  The recommendations are: 
1) ISDH should adopt a rank-order prioritization scheme similar to those 
developed by the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services and the California Department of Health Services in order to 
develop a vaccine prioritization list. 
2) ISDH should adopt an antiviral allocation strategy that places greater 
emphasis on treatment than on prophylaxis.  Non-pharmaceutical 
prophylaxis, such as the use of personal protective equipment, should be 
emphasized. 
3) ISDH should develop an educational toolkit regarding the criteria by 
which the prioritization plan is developed.  This toolkit should be 
disseminated to all relevant stakeholders. 
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Healthcare Workforce Management.  Issues presented include healthcare workers’ duty 
to care, sanctions for worker absenteeism, the use of quarantine and isolation, and the 
responsibilities of other vital but non-clinical employees.  The four recommendations 
regarding these issues are: 
1) ISDH should work with healthcare organizations to identify and 
designate clinical and non-clinical healthcare workers deemed to be 
critically necessary during a pandemic. 
2) The State should set and communicate the expectation that healthcare 
facilities should have adequate supplies of appropriate medical 
equipment, prophylaxis, and related materials and that these institutions 
should ensure that these supplies are readily available to all critical 
personnel expected to interact with patients.   
3) The State of Indiana and healthcare organizations should plan an 
influenza response on the premise of high expectations for workplace 
continuity for clinical healthcare staff.   
4) The State should provide guidance to healthcare organizations and 
facilities in the development of fair and responsive policies for 
reimbursement of employees, for developing incentives for presenting to 
work, and for determining sanctions for noncompliance with expected 
responsibilities. 
All recommendations were guided by the following seven ethical points put forth in the 
Points to Consider document: 1) consistency with the Mission of ISDH and other 
healthcare organizations in general; 2) transparency; 3) public accountability; 4) 
responsiveness; 5) proportionality; 6) reciprocity; and 7) uniformity of implementation. 
 
-- Eric M. Meslin, Jennifer M. Alyea, Paul R. Helft; June 2008 
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Across the globe, governments, health 
departments, institutions, and healthcare 
professionals have been preparing for a 
modern influenza pandemic.  In general, 
these preparations have focused on 
technical issues that may arise, such as 
the assignment of duties and how to 
obtain and stockpile medications 
(University of Toronto Joint Centre for 
Bioethics Pandemic Influenza Working 
Group, 2005).  Technical and scientific 
information, however, is insufficient 
when addressing the moral dilemmas 
that will arise in the event of a pandemic 
(Thompson, Faith, Gibson, & Upshur, 
2006).  For example, how will the State 
allocate scarce resources, approach the 
topic of restricting individual freedom, 
or ensure a policy’s fairness? 
  
Often overlooked is the importance of 
the establishment of ethical guidance 
that may assist in the development and 
implementation of pandemic influenza 
preparation and response plans. To 
address this issue, many efforts have 
been undertaken to develop ethical 
principles, framework, and guidance 
documents designed to assist in the 
development, implementation, and 
evaluation of policies that will be 
regarded as fair and morally acceptable 
by the majority of citizens in the event of 
a crisis (Caddy & Vergez, 2003; Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention 
[CDC], 2007; Kass, 2001; Kotalik, 2005; 
Thompson et al., 2006; University of 
Toronto, 2005).   
 
As in any area of public health policy 
that involves ethical issues and 
community values, making 
determinations about the right course of 
action involves a careful consideration 
of all scientific and medical facts 
coupled with ethical principles and 
values.  On the other hand, no algorithm 
has yet been developed that can 
mechanistically make these decisions 
that have ethics content (Fife, Keener, 
Meslin, Randall, & Schiffmiller, 2004).  
 
This document provides a middle 
approach, called Points to Consider, 
which has been used successfully in 
other areas. Though Points to Consider 
documents “are not regulations and do 
not have the force of law” (Nail & 
Aikers, 2002, p. 445), they attempt to 
incorporate current attitudes of 
government and academia (Nail & 
Aikers, 2002) and are typically utilized 
when control and evaluation policies are 
in their initial developmental stages 
(Estrin, 1990).  This function is 
applicable to the current pandemic 
influenza response policies. The Points 
to Consider document is an intuitive 
strategy meant to provide a guide for 
action and is framed as a series of 
questions, the answers to which are not 
predetermined. The points are neither a 
set of decision rules that mechanistically 
resolve issues at stake, nor a set of 
principles whose interpretation can be 
manipulated by various parties to 
support their particular points of view. 
At the same time, there is (and must be) 
a principled basis for each of the points 
if the document is to be of value. 
 
This document contains seven points 
that we believe ISDH should consider in 
the development of its pandemic 
influenza policies in order to ensure that 
any policy changes will be morally 
sound and acceptable to Hoosiers. It is 
expected that ISDH will directly refer to 
this document when drafting policy and 
when evaluating the impact of policy. It 
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is further expected that any policy 
should be consistent with this document. 
In this way it functions both as an ethics 
framework and as a method for ethical 
policy construction.  
 
Points to Consider 
 
Consistency of the Mission of the 
Indiana State Department of Health and 
the Professional Values of Healthcare in 
General 
 
It is the mission of the Indiana State 
Department of Health to support 
Indiana's economic prosperity and 
quality of life by promoting, protecting, 
and providing for the health of Hoosiers 
in their communities and to do so via 
inter- and intra-agency cooperation and 
data-driven policy.  In preparation for an 
influenza pandemic, everyday methods 
of fulfilling this mission and vision will 
need to be carefully reconsidered in 
response to shifting public health 
priorities. The ISDH has a public set of 
values embodied in its Mission and 
Vision Statements. Similarly, health 
professionals—physicians, nurses, social 
workers, technicians, health 
administrators and others—each 
subscribe to a set of professional 
standards, commitments, and ethical 
values inherent in their own respective 
practices.  To the extent possible, 
decisions regarding pandemic influenza 
preparedness must be internally 
consistent with the respective value and 
mission statements of the individual 
groups and jointly consistent across 
groups.   
 
The following questions should be 
addressed: 
 
• What mechanisms will be used to 
provide the Indiana public with the 
assurance that the policy will be 
consistent with the principles, 
missions, and values of ISDH and 
health care professionals generally? 
• What mechanisms are contemplated 
for attending to conflicts that may 
arise when the proposed policy is 
consistent with the values of ISDH 
but not other organizations?  For 
example, what if the policy conflicts 
with the values of a private medical 
center? 
 
Transparency 
 
No policy can be developed, much less 
implemented, without an assurance that 
its justification and rationale have been 
made clear to those who will be affected 
by it.  Maintaining transparency and 
open communication enhances the 
public’s trust in the decisionmakers and 
may assist in achieving public 
compliance with control measures 
(University of Toronto, 2005).  
Policymakers’ concern that openness 
may lead to public distress does not 
justify a lack of transparency, “just as a 
concern for a patient’s anxiety would not 
justify not warning him of an impending 
stroke” (Kotalik, 2005, p. 430).   
 
When developing a policy, the following 
transparency questions should be raised: 
 
• What steps are being taken to inform 
the public of the policy and its 
implications? 
• What steps are being taken to inform 
healthcare professionals, staff, and 
administrators of the policy and its 
implementation?  
 
Public Accountability 
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It must be possible “to identify and hold 
public officials to account for their 
actions” (Caddy & Vergez, 2003, p. 29) 
in order to avoid an erosion of trust and 
transparency with the public.  In the 
event of a pandemic influenza crisis, 
policymakers are obligated to include a 
method for ensuring that ethical 
guidelines and procedures are upheld 
(Thompson et al., 2006). Should an error 
or oversight occur, it is the responsibility 
of the policymakers to acknowledge the 
situation and address the public 
promptly in order to resolve the resulting 
complications.  Failure to do so may 
result in a loss of public support and 
compliance.   
 
For this reason, decisionmakers should 
be prepared to answer the following 
questions:  
 
• What steps have been taken to 
prepare for a public 
acknowledgement of flaws in the 
policy and/or its implementation that 
may arise as the pandemic 
progresses? 
• Who will take responsibility for such 
flaws or errors while addressing the 
public? 
• What actions will be taken to ensure 
that the effects of any errors will be 
corrected and/or minimized? 
 
Responsiveness 
 
Though it is often accepted that public 
health actions should ultimately be 
determined by experts, involving the 
public can help build trust and increase 
acceptance of the proposed policy (CDC, 
2007).  Public engagement may occur 
along a spectrum: at one end of the 
spectrum, the public is merely informed 
of the policy.  The most extreme version 
of this is to be informed after the policy 
is in place.  A less extreme version is to 
be informed that the policy is being 
developed.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, the public has the power to 
give or withhold permission for the 
policy to be developed or implemented. 
At this extreme, the public is a “partner” 
in the development of the policy. In the 
middle of this spectrum, the public has 
the opportunity to express views about 
the policy. Public health professionals 
may consider these views, but they do 
not have an obligation to do so.   
 
Questions regarding the involvement of 
the public and health professionals 
include: 
 
• What outlets are available to the 
public and to health professionals for 
inclusion in policy formation?  Are 
these outlets accessible to 
representatives from all groups of 
stakeholders? 
• What outlets are available to the 
public and to health professionals for 
expression of concern about or 
dissent for the policy?  For example, 
will a website or call center be 
established to receive this input?  
Dissent alone does not sufficiently 
justify blocking a public health 
program, but if the majority of 
complaints are coming from a 
particular subgroup, corrective 
actions may be required to assuage 
these grievances (Kass, 2001). 
• What steps will be taken to respond 
to the concerns of the public and of 
health professionals?  
 
Proportionality 
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Policies and procedures should be based 
on sound scientific evidence or on the 
best evidence available (CDC, 2007).  
An ineffective intervention will not 
achieve the desired outcome, no matter 
how perfectly implemented.  In addition, 
the policy’s measures should reflect the 
severity of the situation while remaining 
as minimally invasive as possible.  
According to Kass (2001), “The greater 
the burdens posed by the program, the 
stronger the evidence must be to 
demonstrate that the program will 
achieve its goals” (p. 1779).  
 
When determining if a policy’s measures 
are proportional to its need, the 
following questions should be carefully 
considered:  
 
• Do the benefits of the policy 
outweigh the burdens of 
implementing it?  For example, is 
sacrificing individual liberty or 
scarce financial or human resources 
appropriate given the anticipated 
outcome?   
• Could a less restrictive measure 
achieve the desired results? 
• Is any group taking on more burden 
than is necessary to achieve the 
desired outcome (i.e., is any group 
subjected to improper 
discrimination)?  In other words, is 
the policy substantively fair? 
 
Reciprocity 
 
In the event of a pandemic influenza 
crisis, certain communities and 
individuals may face increased risk of 
illness and/or restrictions on their 
autonomy.  In such an event, 
decisionmakers must have a developed 
procedure to minimize the resulting 
encumbrance.  “If leaders expect people 
exposed to or suffering from 
communicable diseases to act in a 
manner that does not put others at risk, it 
is important that they create a social 
environment that does not leave people 
without supports,” writes the University 
of Toronto bioethics group (2005, p. 13).   
 
Questions to be considered include: 
 
• What steps are being taken to 
support those individuals who take 
on a necessary but disproportionate 
burden of the disease, such as health 
care professionals or individuals 
subjected to isolation or quarantine?  
For example, are healthcare workers 
being offered lifelong care for any 
disabilities that result from acquiring 
the illness, or are quarantined 
individuals being protected from 
financial burden resulting from work 
absenteeism? 
• Are those citizens without 
immunization being informed of 
other preventive measures available 
to them? 
• Are those citizens who are denied 
access to limited medical supplies 
informed of other options available 
to them? 
 
Uniformity of Implementation 
 
Consistency in the implementation and 
application of the policy helps to ensure 
that similar cases will be treated equally 
(CDC, 2007).  This will aid in 
eliminating unnecessary discrimination 
and may assist in conveying the policy’s 
fairness to the public and to the affected 
parties.   
 
On the topic of uniformity, the following 
questions should be considered: 
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• What steps are being taken to ensure 
that the policy is being implemented 
consistently throughout the state? 
• How will this consistency of 
implementation be enforced, and by 
whom? 
• What procedures will be in place for 
evaluating policy implementation 
and for proposing revisions to it?  
For example, how will ISDH revise 
procedures if significant new 
epidemiological data arises? 
• What exceptions may be made to the 
policy, and who has the authority to 
make these exceptions?  Under what 
guidelines will this authority 
evaluate the appropriateness of any 
exceptions? 
 
Implementation/Operationalizing the 
Points to Consider 
 
The points in this document should be 
acknowledged explicitly whenever a 
policy is being developed. We intend for 
the reader to answer individual questions 
identified within each point and, in so 
doing, provide a justification for the 
extent to which the point is or is not 
being accommodated in policy. 
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In 2007, the Indiana State Department of 
Health contracted with the Indiana Uni-
versity Center for Bioethics (IUCB) in 
order to explore the ethical dilemmas 
that would arise in an influenza pandem-
ic.  The necessity of implementing al-
tered standards of care comprised one 
such topic to be explored, and this was 
accomplished primarily through litera-
ture review.  In August 2007, IUCB pre-
sented a set of five recommendations to 
the State to address altered standards of 
care.  In the months since the original 
research was conducted, the body of lite-
rature related to such topics has contin-
ued to grow, with many perspectives 
presented in greater depth.  Because the 
area of pandemic planning and response 
remains a developing field, it was neces-
sary for IUCB to revise previous docu-
ments and recommendations in order to 
reflect the most current thinking on the 
topic. 
 
As with the previous documents, a sig-
nificant amount of the research for the 
current documents was based on a re-
view of the literature and relevant poli-
cies.  In addition, expert panels were 
convened to determine the feasibility of 
implementing the previous recommenda-
tions, as well as to help develop case 
studies that could be used as part of an 
instructional tool that would stimulate 
discussion and critical thinking.  These 
case studies represent real-world scena-
rios that may occur in an influenza pan-
demic, and it should be noted that they 
may be applicable to several areas of 
pandemic influenza planning that are 
presented in the four technical advisory 
documents developed by IUCB. 
 
Case Studies 
 
#1. Three weeks into the first pandemic 
wave, the intensivist who has been di-
recting care at a hospital has become ill 
and a replacement is found. The new 
physician, an internist who had been 
staffing at an alternate care site, ex-
presses deep anxiety about the rigid tri-
age criteria in use, and he states he will 
not abide by them because of fear of be-
ing sued for malpractice. What can be 
done? 
 
#2. After the pandemic begins, a hospital 
reports that 30% of its workforce has 
become ill, and another 25% has refused 
to report to work.  Several people have 
offered to volunteer at the hospital to 
supplement its workforce.  How can the 
hospital identify appropriate volunteers? 
 
Introduction 
 
With nearly 40 years passed since the 
last influenza pandemic, experts are 
warning that the next pandemic is over-
due and that the H5N1 strain of avian 
influenza has pandemic potential (Ontar-
io Health Plan for an Influenza Pandem-
ic [OHPIP], 2006).  According to the 
World Health Organization (2006), 
H5N1 “has met all prerequisites for the 
start of a pandemic save one: an ability 
to spread efficiently and sustainably 
among humans” (para. 18).  As a result 
of this threat, international organizations, 
governments, health departments, insti-
tutions, and healthcare professionals 
throughout the world are currently pre-
paring for a modern influenza pandemic.  
Such preparations require a shift in 
priorities and expectations in medical 
care delivery and setting.  This includes 
the allocation of “scarce equipment, 
supplies, and personnel in a way that 
saves the largest number of lives in con-
Altered Standards 
trast to the traditional focus on saving 
individuals” (Agency for Healthcare Re-
search and Quality [AHRQ], 2005, p. 8).   
  
A scarcity of resources within the con-
text of a severe influenza pandemic 
emergency will inevitably require an al-
teration in healthcare practice.  Indeed, 
not only will practice need to be mod-
ified but so too might the very norms 
and assumptions underlying provision of 
healthcare.  As such, any recommenda-
tions for altering the standards of care 
will require careful consideration and 
justification.  This document addresses 
the ethical implications of implementing 
altered standards of care, including al-
ternative sites for providing healthcare 
services and altered standards for utiliza-
tion of healthcare personnel.   
 
The Issues 
 
A review of the relevant literature 
(AHRQ, 2005; AHRQ, 2007; Berlinger 
& Moses, 2007; Bogdan et al., 2004; 
Cantrill, Eisert, Pons, & Vinci, 2004; 
Center for Law and the Public’s Health 
at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins uni-
versities, 2001; De Ville, 2007; Gomer-
sall, Loo, Joynt, & Taylor, 2007; Gostin 
et al., 2002; Illinois Department of 
Health, 2006; Levin, Gebbie, & Qureshi, 
2007; Martin, 2007; Minnesota Depart-
ment of Health, 2006; New York State 
Workgroup on Ventilator Allocation in 
an Influenza Pandemic, 2007; Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration 
[OSHA], 2007; OHPIP, 2006; Public 
Health Agency of Canada, 2006; Qure-
shi et al., 2005; Rubinson et al., 2005; 
United States Department of Health and 
Human Services [HHS], 2007a; United 
States Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2007b; World Health Organi-
zation, 2006) found five areas of agree-
ment regarding the implementation of 
altered standards of care.   
 
These topics are presented in Table 1 be-
low. 
 
Table 1: Areas of Agreement Regarding Altered Standards of Care 
Issue Explanation 
 
Timing of protocol development 
 
Planning must be done prior to a pandemic in order to ensure 
the most ethically and operationally sound policies.  “Actions 
that are carefully planned, justified, and executed are easier to 
defend retrospectively than those made out of panic or confu-
sion” (De Ville, 2007, p. 317). 
 
Communication with the public and 
healthcare providers 
 
It is essential to make the public and healthcare providers 
aware of the need for altered standards of care, as well as the 
details about the specific alterations.  Messages must be consis-
tent, simple, and clear and take into consideration the various 
segments of the population (e.g., non-English speakers).  This 
will help to gain compliance and reduce civil unrest. 
 
Management of psychological crises 
 
The public in general and healthcare staff in particular may ex-
perience emotional and psychological distress due to the unique 
demands that may arise in the event of a public health crisis.  
Psychological First Aid should be provided in order to help al-
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leviate this situation. 
 
Legal protection for providers and facili-
ties 
 
Healthcare providers and facilities may face litigation in re-
sponse to decisions that are necessitated by the altered stan-
dards of care.  Because healthcare facilities, professionals, 
staff, and volunteers may be reluctant to provide care due to 
fear of legal repercussions, alterations to relevant healthcare 
laws and regulations are necessary in the event of an emergen-
cy in order to ensure the participation of as many providers as 
possible.  Planners must identify in advance any applicable 
laws and regulations that may be altered or suspended during 
an emergency.  These may include the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act, the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act, the Federal Volunteer Protection 
Act, and the Good Samaritan Law (AHRQ, 2007).  For further 
discussion on the legal aspects of influenza pandemic planning, 
please refer to the document produced by individuals from the 
Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis, which was de-
veloped under the same grant as this document. 
 
Security 
 
The combination of the health crisis and the shift in healthcare 
delivery methods may result in civil unrest and increased vi-
olence, particularly in healthcare facilities.  Increased and ade-
quate security at each healthcare delivery site will be necessary 
in order to protect the safety of patients and providers alike. 
 
We note that though these issues 
represent areas of agreement, other ethi-
cal issues may not enjoy the same level 
of accord, perhaps because the deviation 
from standard healthcare norms affects 
several areas of healthcare delivery.  
Three additional issues arise: (a) the 
need for alternate care sites; (b) adequate 
staffing; and (c) standards of documenta-
tion.    
 
Alternate Care Sites.  Pandemic influen-
za will require planners to consider al-
ternate care sites for healthcare delivery, 
quarantine and isolation, and mortuary 
services if hospitals and morgues be-
come overwhelmed (AHRQ, 2005; 
AHRQ, 2007; Bogdan et al., 2004; Can-
trill, Eisert, Pons, & Vinci, 2004; Center 
for Law and the Public’s Health at 
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins univer-
sities, 2001; Gostin et al., 2002; HHS, 
2007a; HHS, 2007b; Illinois Department 
of Health, 2006; Levin et al., 2007; 
OSHA, 2007; OHPIP, 2006; Public 
Health Agency of Canada, 2006; Rubin-
son et al., 2005).  In addition to the ques-
tion of which facilities to utilize, plan-
ners also will be expected to consider 
how they will obtain access to and con-
trol of these facilities (coercion vs. part-
nership) and whether the owners and 
administrators of these facilities will be 
compensated or insured for their assis-
tance. 
 
Adequate Staffing.  A pandemic inevita-
bly will lead to staffing losses resulting 
from illness, fear, and conflicting obliga-
tions (e.g., family needs).  Due to the 
combination of such absenteeism and a 
surge in patients, a shortage of workers 
is expected (AHRQ, 2005; AHRQ, 
2007; Bogdan et al., 2004; Cantrill et al., 
2004; Center for Law and the Public’s 
Health at Georgetown and Johns 
Hopkins universities, 2001; De Ville, 
2007; Gostin et al., 2002; HHS, 2007a; 
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HHS, 2007b; New York State 
Workgroup on Ventilator Allocation in 
an Influenza Pandemic, 2007; OHPIP, 
2006; Rubinson et al., 2005). Institutions 
should consider how to anticipate and 
address these shortages because the alte-
ration of staff members’ regular respon-
sibilities may result in increased stress 
for the affected staff or a decreased qual-
ity of the usual care.    
 
Standards of Documentation.  In the 
event of an influenza pandemic, health-
care facilities' current documentation 
standards for charting, medical records, 
diagnostic procedures, and consent “will 
be impossible to maintain” (AHRQ, 
2005, p. 10).  The consequences of these 
challenges include backlogs of patients 
to be seen and deaths to be processed 
(AHRQ, 2005; AHRQ, 2007; Gostin et 
al., 2002), which may lead to delayed 
care and delayed burial, potentially dis-
rupting the customs of certain religious 
groups (AHRQ, 2007).  The modifica-
tion of documentation standards, howev-
er, may result in inadequate or inappro-
priate care and difficulties obtaining 
reimbursement (AHRQ, 2005). 
 
The Approaches 
 
Using Alternate Care Sites.  Bogdan et 
al. (2004) write that call centers can be 
important resources involved in 
processes including “syndromic surveil-
lance, emergency medicine and triage, 
and home health care support” (p. 34).  
The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (2007) and the Illinois 
Department of Health (2006) reiterate 
the importance of the use of telephones 
in providing health advice to the public 
and in applying triage techniques.  The 
one-on-one communication that callers 
receive may be an important source of 
reassurance and instruction, and utilizing 
such an approach may be useful in alle-
viating hospital overflow.   
 
Should hospitals require an expansion of 
their facilities, several possible locations 
have been suggested to handle triage, 
non-critical care, isolation and quaran-
tine, and mortuary services, among other 
functions.  For medical care provision, 
such facilities include outpatient clinics, 
adult detention facilities, aircraft han-
gars, churches, military facilities, 
schools, hotels, convalescent care facili-
ties, and sports facilities (AHRQ, 2007; 
Cantrill et al., 2004; OHPIP, 2006; 
OSHA, 2007), provided they are readily 
accessible to the public (e.g., near public 
transportation).  For alternate sites for 
mortuary services, the Illinois Depart-
ment of Health (2006) recommends 
areas such as “hangers [sic], large garag-
es, [and] National Guard armories” (p. 
81).  The department also advises 
against the use of schools and recom-
mends that sites be away from public 
view.  Gostin et al. (2002) recommend 
that if private property (e.g., a sports fa-
cility) is confiscated by the government 
for public services such as acute care, 
the owner(s) should be compensated.  
The Public Health Agency of Canada 
(2006) similarly states that the Canadian 
government may seize property as a last 
resort, but this must occur with “due 
compensation” (p. H-13).  The Illinois 
Department of Health (2006) has a simi-
lar stance supporting the provision of 
compensation.  Gostin et al. (2002) state, 
however, that if property is taken and 
destroyed because it poses a serious 
health threat, then the owner(s) need not 
be compensated.  Another approach to 
obtaining alternate care sites is through 
partnership and agreement with, instead 
of the outright seizure from, the owners 
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of facilities that potentially may be used 
(OHPIP, 2006). Such collaboration 
should be initiated prior to an acute 
emergency.  The OHPIP (2006) and 
Public Health Agency of Canada (2006) 
documents also address the inclusion of 
insurance coverage for the utilized sites.  
Such coverage includes issues such as 
“fire, damage, theft, and site liability” 
(OHPIP, 2006, p. 11A-6).   
 
Levin et al. (2007) deviate from the typi-
cal discussion of expanding critical care 
facilities and instead state that “there is 
no level of care that can be provided in 
these settings that cannot be given in the 
home” (p. 575).  The authors state that 
in-home care provided by home-care 
personnel, family, and friends is prefera-
ble to care provided at alternate sites, 
since alternate care sites are likely to be 
congested and not conducive to adequate 
sanitation and hygiene procedures.  Such 
conditions may worsen the already de-
clining standards of care provided during 
the pandemic.    Because of this, the au-
thors recommend the inclusion of home 
healthcare entities in the planning 
process.   
 
Ensuring Adequate Staffing.  Should the 
number of employees required to sustain 
normal operations and standards be in-
sufficient, healthcare facilities may sup-
plement staff from various sources.  The 
first option is to supplement the work-
force from the regular hospital staff.  
This would require an alteration in re-
sponsibilities.  For example, Rubinson et 
al. (2005) state that if hospitals have a 
shortage of intensivists, those in nonin-
tensivist positions may instead work 
with critically ill patients under the su-
pervision of an intensivist.  The New 
York State Workgroup (2007) also in-
cludes a discussion of the modification 
of individual responsibilities, stating that 
“less experienced staff may need to 
manage patients” (p. 12), so added duties 
should be simplified to the furthest ex-
tent possible.  The Minnesota Depart-
ment of Health (2006) states that regis-
tered nurses may delegate duties such as 
medication administration to other em-
ployees, provided that these employees 
are “supervised by an RN or monitored 
by an LPN” (p. 4).  Gomersall et al. 
(2007) recommend using operating thea-
tre staff because such individuals “are 
familiar with caring for unconscious 
ventilated patients and are likely to be 
relatively available when elective sur-
gery is discontinued during the peak of a 
pandemic” (p. 744).   
 
According to AHRQ (2005) and OSHA 
(2007), other potential staff should be 
identified prior to a pandemic and should 
begin training in their new responsibili-
ties and in infection control.  These staff 
may include “retired or currently unem-
ployed but qualified volunteer provid-
ers” (AHRQ, 2005, p. 27), reserve mili-
tary and nursing providers, medical, 
nursing, and respiratory therapy stu-
dents, emergency medical technicians, 
health care aides (Public Health Agency 
of Canada, 2006), veterinarians, dentists, 
and pharmacists.  In addition, non-
medical responders may be trained to 
“support health and medical care opera-
tions” (AHRQ, 2005, p. 27; Rubinson et 
al., 2005).  Healthcare professionals who 
are not currently licensed in the state are 
another potential source, even though 
their involvement in providing care may 
result in what would ordinarily be consi-
dered substandard care. Licensing re-
quirements may be suspended via gu-
bernatorial orders (Cantrill et al., 2004).   
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In order to ensure the ability to call upon 
these individuals in times of staffing 
needs and to verify their credentials and 
capabilities, AHRQ (2005), Cantrill et 
al. (2004), Rubinson et al. (2005), and 
the Public Health Agency of Canada 
(2006) recommend the development of a 
registry or database of potential re-
placement staff.  Such a database may 
expedite the process of increasing staff-
ing, as well as make certain that the 
called-upon individuals are qualified to 
perform their newly assigned duties.  
However, “developing and maintaining 
databases of staff is a time consuming 
and expensive task.  Databases are only 
useful if kept up to date with licensing, 
skill set and contact information” (Public 
Health Agency of Canada, 2006, p. H-
12).  In addition to database develop-
ment, AHRQ (2007) recommends the 
development of identification proce-
dures, such as site-generated photo IDs, 
for staff members in response to the un-
familiarity of the staff with each other.  
This will help to assure patients and em-
ployees alike that all workers have been 
credentialed and/or verified. 
 
Whether retrieved from existing staff or 
from a group of volunteers, AHRQ 
(2005) states that healthcare workers in-
volved in providing care during an in-
fluenza pandemic should be instructed 
and prepared to the greatest extent poss-
ible.  “Planners should not assume that 
individual providers will know how to 
deliver appropriate care in a mass ca-
sualty event, but rather should develop 
or identify training programs to ensure a 
knowledgeable and systematic, coordi-
nated response effort” (AHRQ, 2005, p. 
28).  Martin (2007) echoes this statement 
and urges planners not to assume that 
providers understand the specifics of 
pandemic influenza.  Additionally, Mar-
tin recommends that providers be admi-
nistered a test to determine the effective-
ness of instructional activities and to en-
sure that providers are adequately pre-
pared.  Rubinson et al. (2005) state that 
staff should receive training in the use of 
personal protective equipment, which 
will help workers feel more adequately 
prepared for dealing with infected pa-
tients.  Educating healthcare workers 
with information about the etiology of 
the illness and its proper control meas-
ures is expected to increase willingness 
to provide care (Tzeng, 2004) and also 
will aid in maintaining workers’ safety 
and health. 
 
Finally, some literature suggests the ne-
cessity of meeting various needs of the 
staff—regular and volunteer—during the 
crisis in order to ease the burden of the 
heavy and stressful workload.  These 
needs may involve housing (AHRQ, 
2007; Center for Law and the Public’s 
Health at Georgetown and Johns 
Hopkins universities, 2001), transporta-
tion, child care, pet care (Cantrill et al., 
2004; Qureshi et al., 2005), and workers 
compensation (Rhyne, 2007).  Addition-
al compensation for those working in 
times of a pandemic also has been rec-
ommended (Berlinger & Moses, 2007; 
OHPIP, 2006). 
 
Documentation Alterations. AHRQ 
(2005) and Martin (2007) suggest that it 
is necessary to alter current documenta-
tion procedures in such a way that ade-
quate information is gathered regarding 
patient medical needs and means of 
reimbursement “without posing an un-
due administrative burden” (AHRQ, 
2005, p. 13).  Martin (2007) emphasizes 
the need to identify information that may 
be considered extraneous in the case of a 
pandemic event prior to the pandemic 
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occurring.  Though changes in documen-
tation procedures may result in de-
creased patient privacy and confiden-
tiality, the rights of patients should be 
preserved to the greatest extent possible 
(AHRQ, 2005).  Nonetheless, some ar-
gue that citizens must be required to sa-
crifice some of their liberties in order to 
maintain the health and safety of the 
masses (Gostin et al., 2002).   
 
Documentation not only affects patient 
care and reimbursement, it also affects 
mortuary procedures.  A backlog of mor-
tality processing may result in delays in 
burial.  Gostin et al. (2002) write that 
“the authorities are required to exercise 
their powers with respect for cultural and 
religious beliefs and practices such as 
observing, wherever possible, religious 
laws regarding burial” (p. 626).  Similar-
ly, AHRQ (2007) writes that procedures 
for complying with individuals’ funeral 
and burial practices should be outlined in 
advance, while remaining flexible to 
meet the demands of the situation.  Reli-
gious and cultural communities should 
be informed of any such procedures, 
which should “ensure that the minimum 
level of disruption to usual cultural prac-
tices and the maximum level of dignity 
are afforded the deceased and their fami-
lies” (AHRQ, 2007, p. 73).  A major bar-
rier to complying with such procedures, 
however, is that the remains may pose a 
threat to the living in the event of an in-
fluenza pandemic (AHRQ, 2007).  In 
such an event, careful consideration 
must be made to manage conflicting 
priorities. 
 
Recommendations 
 
The discussion provided in this docu-
ment lends itself to five recommenda-
tions that the Indiana University Center 
for Bioethics believes would lead to the 
development of ethically sound state-
wide policies regarding altered standards 
of care.  Each recommendation is fol-
lowed by its justification and has been 
evaluated by an expert panel convened 
by IUCB. 
 
Recommendation 1: The State of In-
diana should develop a protocol for 
altered standards of care, which 
would take effect for all healthcare in-
stitutions upon the declaration of a 
statewide pandemic influenza emer-
gency by the Governor.  Triggers for 
this declaration should be identified 
prior to their occurrence.  This proto-
col should specify those healthcare 
professionals affected by the protocol 
and should include legal protections 
for healthcare providers and institu-
tions. 
 
It is necessary for any decisions about 
altering the standards of providing 
healthcare to patients in Indiana to be 
statewide and uniform.  As a part of this 
protocol, it is critical for the State to 
identify relevant laws and regulations 
that may need to be altered or suspended 
during an emergency in order to provide 
legal protections to healthcare institu-
tions, providers, staff, and volunteers.  
Doing so may increase healthcare work-
ers’ and healthcare institutions’ com-
pliance with the recommended altera-
tions by removing the fear of litigation 
that may result from following altered 
standards of care.  It also may help to 
ensure that these altered standards are 
implemented consistently statewide. 
 
Expert panel members expressed con-
cern about the extent to which the State 
would be able to provide protection.  
Members emphasized the need to clarify 
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how such protections would be imple-
mented, as fear of litigation would be a 
major concern for healthcare providers 
and undoubtedly would influence their 
adherence to altered standards protocol.  
For further discussion on this topic, 
please refer to the document regarding 
legal issues during an influenza pandem-
ic that was produced by individuals from 
the Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis. 
 
Recommendation 2: The State should 
begin immediately to engage own-
ers/administrators of all healthcare 
facilities in discussions about the im-
pact of a statewide protocol for altered 
standards of care, including the selec-
tion of alternate care sites.  All efforts 
should be made to agree to these site 
acquisitions by consensus and part-
nership. 
 
The key to a smooth transition from the 
current system to any system that 
amends the standards of care is the em-
phasis on early planning.  The use of 
partnership instead of coercion may re-
sult in less resistance and greater com-
pliance to the use of alternate care facili-
ties.  In addition, it is recommended that 
such facilities be insured and the owners 
compensated to the most reasonable ex-
tent possible for their cooperation so that 
they do not suffer large financial or 
property losses.  Finally, such facilities 
should be located in readily accessible 
sites to ensure ease of access for citizens. 
 
Recommendation 3: The State should 
design, develop, and maintain a data-
base of healthcare workers and en-
courage all healthcare institutions, in-
cluding professional schools, to identi-
fy potential healthcare workers and 
their skills and qualifications and reg-
ister them into this database prior to a 
pandemic. 
 
Through the creation of a database, vo-
lunteers such as retired or inactive nurses 
and physicians, as well as professionals 
from other related fields (e.g., dentists), 
could be called upon in times of emer-
gency.  A common database can be ac-
cessed efficiently to manage workforce 
flow. 
 
Recommendation 4: The State should 
ensure that a comprehensive program 
is developed and implemented to pro-
vide all healthcare workers with ade-
quate training and information re-
garding pandemic influenza and their 
anticipated responsibilities. 
 
By being prepared, these potential staff 
members are more likely to report to 
work and to provide care of the greatest 
quality possible.  In addition, these 
workers should be provided compensa-
tion and have their basic needs met (e.g., 
housing, child care) while working under 
the stressful conditions. 
 
Recommendation 5: The State should 
provide guidance on developing mi-
nimal standards for modified docu-
mentation procedures that can be im-
plemented efficiently at the time of a 
pandemic for all healthcare institu-
tions, mortuaries, and other relevant 
organizations. 
 
This will help to reduce the backlog of 
patients and fatalities; provide patients 
with the most appropriate care available 
given their individual needs; reduce the 
privacy and confidentiality each patient 
must sacrifice; and ensure reimburse-
ment for the healthcare facilities.  If at 
all possible, mortuary procedures should 
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allow families to carry out their desired 
funeral and burial practices, provided the 
deceased does not pose a significant 
threat to the health of the community.  
The possibility of mortuary delays and 
non-adherence to religious burial prac-
tices should be discussed with citizens 
and faith-based communities in advance. 
 
Expert panel members emphasized the 
need not only to develop altered docu-
mentation standards for intake proce-
dures, but also for daily review of pa-
tients’ health status. 
 
Application to the Points to Consider 
 
In our previous work we developed an 
ethical framework entitled Points to 
Consider.  This framework was designed 
to provide guidance for those working 
through specific ethical issues and as a 
tool for assessing the ethical basis for 
proposed policy.  The Points to Consider 
contains seven “points” that IUCB be-
lieved would need to be addressed in any 
policy development if such a policy were 
to be considered ethically sound and ac-
ceptable to Hoosiers.  
 
Expert panel members were provided 
with the Points to Consider document as 
part of their deliberations but were not 
required to use it as their only guide. 
 
We believe that the recommendations 
presented in this TAD are consistent 
with the ethical framework presented in 
the Points to Consider document.   
 
The aforementioned recommendations, 
in addition to the areas of agreement re-
garding altered standards of care men-
tioned earlier, adhere to several of the 
points stated in the Points to Consider 
document.  These relevant points are 
presented in Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2: Points to Consider Reflected in the Altered Standards of Care Document 
Ethical Point to Consider Applicability to Recommendations 
 
Transparency 
 
Providing the public and healthcare providers with 
information regarding alterations in healthcare pro-
cedures will help to achieve compliance with these 
procedures.  Discussions with citizens and faith-
based communities regarding potential barriers to 
adherence to funeral and burial procedures will pre-
pare these communities for potential delays and al-
terations that may occur while attempting to follow 
cultural practices.  By making these communities 
aware of these implications prior to the event, they 
may be more likely to comply with the necessary 
course of action. 
 
Responsiveness 
 
Through partnerships with the own-
ers/administrators of potential alternate care sites, 
planners may develop procedures that will ensure 
that the public’s health needs are met while assuring 
owners that their facilities will be properly insured 
and protected. 
Altered Standards 
 
Proportionality 
 
Alternate care sites are to be used only when hospit-
als lack sufficient capacity; alternate staffing proce-
dures are to be used only during a staffing shortage; 
and documentation procedures are to switch to trun-
cated procedures only when current standards are 
impossible to maintain given a large patient influx.  
Patients must sacrifice privacy and confidentiality 
only when absolutely necessary to maintain a func-
tioning care facility. 
 
Reciprocity 
 
Providing legal protection and mental health servic-
es to healthcare workers will help to ease the dis-
proportionate amount of burden they will bear.  
Preparing these workers prior to a pandemic will 
reduce the stress they will face.  Providing addition-
al security also will help to ease the burden on 
healthcare professionals, since they will be more 
able to perform their duties in the absence of fear.  
Furthermore, meeting the basic needs of these 
workers, such as providing housing for non-local 
volunteers, will help to reduce stress and retain 
these staff members.  Apart from staffing reciproci-
ty, the owners/administrators of alternate care site 
facilities are to be provided insurance and/or be 
reimbursed for their contributions.   
 
Case Study Responses 
 
#1.  Upon the governor’s declaration of a 
statewide pandemic influenza emergen-
cy, legal protections will be put into 
place to protect healthcare workers who 
follow altered standards protocol from 
litigation.  The new physician should be 
informed of these legal protections and 
the necessity to follow altered standards 
protocol to ensure fair and consistent 
implementation. 
 
#2.  The hospitals will have available to 
them a database of potential alternate 
healthcare workers whose skills and qua-
lifications have been assessed prior to 
the occurrence of the pandemic.  These 
may include retired nurses and physi-
cians, as well as medical and nursing 
students. 
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In 2007, the Indiana State Department of 
Health (ISDH) contracted with the 
Indiana University Center for Bioethics 
(IUCB) to explore ethical dilemmas that 
may arise in an influenza pandemic.  The 
necessity of implementing triage in 
response to limited medical supplies and 
equipment comprised one such topic to 
be explored, which was accomplished 
primarily through literature review.  In 
August 2007, IUCB presented a set of 
three recommendations to the State to 
address triage protocol.  In the months 
since the original research was 
conducted, the body of literature related 
to this topic has continued to grow, with 
many perspectives presented in greater 
depth.  Because the area of pandemic 
planning and response remains a 
developing field, it was useful for IUCB 
to revise previous documents and 
recommendations in order to reflect the 
most current thinking on the topic. 
 
As with the previous documents, a 
significant amount of the research for the 
current document was based on a review 
of literature and policies.  In addition, 
expert panels were convened to 
determine the feasibility of 
implementing the previous 
recommendations, as well as to refine 
these recommendations.   Additionally, 
case studies were developed to be used 
as part of an instructional tool, as well as 
to stimulate critical thinking and 
discussion.  These case studies represent 
real-world scenarios that may occur in 
an influenza pandemic, and it should be 
noted that they may be applicable to 
several areas of pandemic influenza 
planning that are presented in the four 
technical advisory documents developed 
by IUCB. 
 
Case Studies 
 
#1.  A 67-year-old housekeeper and a 
24-year-old medical student present to 
the emergency room with pandemic 
influenza. An unemployed 39-year-old 
also presents after having been in a 
motor vehicle accident.  All patients 
require a ventilator to survive, but the 
hospital has only one available.  Who 
should get the ventilator? 
 
#2.  After two weeks of implementing 
triage criteria that were developed for 
pandemic use, several physicians begin 
to question the methodology they have 
been instructed to use.  They express 
their concerns to their supervisor and 
state that they would like to implement 
alternative triage methodologies.  What 
steps should be taken? 
 
Introduction 
 
As of June 2, 2008, the World Health 
Organization (WHO, 2008) reports that 
383 human cases of avian influenza 
H5N1 have been confirmed and that 241 
of these cases have been fatal.  With 
experts warning that an influenza 
pandemic is overdue and that H5N1 has 
pandemic potential (Ontario Health Plan 
for an Influenza Pandemic [OHPIP], 
2006), governments, health departments, 
healthcare professionals, and many 
others have been working to develop 
response plans for such a crisis.  Those 
plans must include ethical strategies for 
allocating resources that become 
insufficient to support the demand, 
because “shortages of specialized staff, 
medical equipment, and supplies could 
limit the number of patients who can 
receive the appropriate supportive 
critical care interventions” (Rubinson et 
Triage 
al., 2005, p. 6).  Such resource allocation 
strategies may be referred to as “triage” 
of scarce resources because they 
necessarily involve prioritizing which 
patients will receive care when not all 
can.  Consistent, ethically defensible 
methods for allocating scarce resources 
require careful planning and 
deliberation.  This document presents 
several ethical issues that must be 
considered and addressed in the 
development of a triage protocol for 
Indiana, followed by a set of 
recommendations.  When considering 
the recommendations, it should be noted 
that triage prioritization differs from 
immunization prioritization in the event 
of an influenza pandemic.  The 
arguments presented in this document 
refer only to triage.   
 
The Issues 
 
A review of the small but growing 
literature on allocation of scarce 
resources during a pandemic event 
(Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality [AHRQ], 2007; Berlinger & 
Moses, 2007; Burkle, 2006; Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 
2007; Challen, Bright, Bentley, & 
Walter, 2007; Christian et al., 2006; 
Clarian Ethics Policy Review Committee 
Working Group on Ethics in Pandemic 
Flu [Clarian], 2006; Hick & O’Laughlin, 
2006; Hick, Rubinson, O’Laughlin, & 
Farmer, 2007; Indiana Pandemic 
Influenza Community Advisory Groups, 
2006; Letts, 2006; Levin, Gebbie, & 
Qureshi, 2007;  McGorty et al., 2007; 
Melnychuk & Kenny, 2006; New York 
State Workgroup on Ventilator 
Allocation in an Influenza Pandemic, 
2007; OHPIP, 2006; Rubinson et al., 
2005; Utah Hospitals and Health 
Systems Administration [Utah HHSA], 
2007) suggests several areas of 
agreement, summarized in Table 1 
below. 
 
Table 1: Areas of Agreement Regarding Triage 
Issue Explanation 
 
Timing of protocol 
development 
 
It is necessary to establish triage guidelines prior to the occurrence of an 
influenza pandemic in order to make the most ethically sound, well-
considered choices possible. 
 
Triage classification 
personnel 
 
Identification of who will be responsible for making triage decisions is 
necessary before an influenza pandemic strikes.  Teams of triage officers, 
such as supervising clinicians, are recommended.  Individual physicians 
should not make such decisions unless absolutely necessary, in order to 
avoid conflicting obligations regarding patients and the public and to ensure 
equitable application of triage guidelines.  
 
Location of 
implementation 
 
Policies must be implemented statewide and/or regionally in order to ensure 
fairness and equal opportunity for care for all the State’s citizens. 
 
Transparency and public 
awareness 
 
Preparing the community for the challenges in an influenza pandemic event 
will help to reduce civil unrest and may assist with gaining compliance. 
 
Managing psychological 
crises 
 
Clinicians, first responders, the afflicted and their families, and the “worried 
well” may all require Psychological First Aid to treat emotional distress, and 
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provisions should be made to make this available to them. 
 
Proportionality in 
implementation 
 
Inclusion and exclusion factors should only be considered when all other 
options have been exhausted.  For example, if canceling or postponing 
elective surgeries will result in a sufficient supply of ventilators, then other 
criteria need not be considered. 
 
Inclusion of patients in 
acute care 
 
Non-influenza patients in acute care facilities also must be included in triage 
in order to maximize the number of lives saved.  This also will help to ensure 
that care and resources are distributed fairly and similarly among all acute 
care patients. 
 
Use of palliative care 
 
Those denied access to ventilators and other medical resources should be 
provided palliative care and pain management. 
 
Flexibility of guidelines 
 
Because current triage protocols have yet to be tried in a real-world situation, 
their effectiveness and potential drawbacks are not entirely known.  In 
addition, technological advances may require revision of procedures in order 
to accommodate new innovations.  Triage guidelines must be adaptable. 
 
Plan for legal protection 
 
Healthcare providers may face litigation for following triage criteria.  
Providing legal protection for those who make allocation decisions using 
established guidelines will increase healthcare worker compliance and 
ensure consistent implementation. 
 
In addition to these issues, the use of 
smart systems for assigning prognosis 
based on acute physiology is a vital 
component of any system of triage.  
Such predictive systems have been 
developed in critical care populations to 
predict the likelihood of a patient’s 
survival to discharge, including 
APACHE III, SAPS, LOD, MODS, and 
MPM II (Hick & O’Laughlin, 2006).  
Variations of the Sequential Organ 
Failure Assessment model—sometimes 
referred to as the Sepsis-related Organ 
Failure Assessment model or SOFA—
arose most frequently in the literature 
review as the fairest and most effective 
prognostic scoring method (Christian et 
al., 2006; Hick & O’Laughlin, 2006; 
New York State Workgroup, 2007; 
OHPIP, 2006; Utah HHSA, 2007).  
SOFA assesses six organ systems, “each 
graded from 0 to 4 points according to 
the degree of dysfunction” (Arts, de 
Keizer, Vroom, & de Jonge, 2005, p. 
1988).  The resulting scores can be 
compared to predetermined treatment 
categories to establish a patient’s 
treatment plan.  For example, individuals 
with a SOFA score greater than 11 have 
more than a 90% mortality rate (OHPIP, 
2006) and would be unlikely to benefit 
from intensive care treatment.  Despite 
being frequently recommended, SOFA 
has been faulted for not being validated 
in pediatric populations (Hick et al., 
2007).  In addition, because it was 
“derived and validated on cohorts” (p. 
5), it may not accurately predict 
outcomes for individuals.  Furthermore, 
some may reject its use because it 
depends partly on laboratory testing, 
which may be “resource intensive and 
will unnecessarily delay triage 
decisions” (Talmor, Jones, Rubinson, 
Howell, & Shapiro, 2007, p. 1255).  
Nonetheless, SOFA, or variations upon 
it, is so far the most recommended 
algorithm for use.   
 
32 
Triage 
Because triage criteria have been 
recommended for use in all acute care 
patients, as mentioned in the table above, 
other conditions in addition to pandemic 
influenza may need to be assessed.  The 
Utah HHSA (2007) document addresses 
these, such as the consideration of 
trauma score and burn severity in triage 
decision-making.   
 
Though we found general agreement 
regarding the majority of ethical 
considerations that should affect triage 
planning, other key issues surrounding 
triage allocation decisions remain 
unresolved.  These involve disagreement 
over which non-physiological 
considerations should be incorporated 
into inclusion and exclusion criteria.  
These considerations include: role in 
society (e.g., should healthcare workers 
receive preferential treatment within an 
allocation framework?), age (e.g., should 
younger patients receive preferential 
treatment compared to older patients?), 
and “social worth” (e.g., should any 
other individual characteristics influence 
preferential treatment?). 
 
Table 2: Summary of Groups’ Non-physiological Considerations for Triage Criteria 
Source Social Factors Age 
AHRQ (2007) -- -- 
CDC (2007) ● ● 
Challen et al. (2007) ● ● 
Clarian (2006) ● ● 
New York State Workgroup 
(2007) 
-- -- 
OHPIP (2006) -- ● 
Utah HHSA (2007) ● ● 
● = should be considered 
-- = not considered 
 
The Approaches 
 
Those Supporting Inclusion of Social 
Role and Age in Triage Criteria.  
According to the CDC (2007), in the 
event of an influenza pandemic, 
preserving society’s function should be 
given priority over maximizing the 
number of lives saved.  Likewise, 
McGorty et al. (2007) state that 
“assuring the functioning of society” (p. 
41) should be one factor taken into 
account when making disease control 
and medical decisions, but 
socioeconomic factors should not be 
included in such decision-making.  This 
may seem contradictory, particularly 
because an individual’s socioeconomic 
status may be linked directly to his or 
her social function.  Nonetheless, such 
an argument suggests a need for the 
determination of an individual’s “value 
to societal function” and his or her 
contributions to society.  The CDC 
(2007) acknowledges the difficulties 
inherent in this process and advocates 
discussion among diverse stakeholders 
in order to resolve this issue, as well as 
transparency with the public in order to 
increase acceptance and compliance.  
The Clarian (2006) working group 
addresses the issue of social role by 
placing healthcare workers, public health 
officials, first emergency responders, 
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government officials, and workers 
involved with critical infrastructure in 
positions of priority over others in 
treatment allocation decisions.  Challen 
et al. (2007) also support these 
considerations and write that “social 
factors” (p. 2) should be considered in 
patient categorization.  Their scoring 
system includes a point system that takes 
into account “social isolation … [and a] 
performance status of limited activity or 
worse” (p. 2).  Similarly, the Utah 
HHSA (2007) draft document states that 
an additional consideration should 
include whether the “patient is homeless 
and/or has someone to care for [him or 
her] at home” (p. 3).  Although 
determining social function is a complex 
undertaking, at the minimum the 
government workforce can be prioritized 
legally in the event of an emergency 
(AHRQ, 2007).  The literature suggests 
clearly that, in cases where priority is 
given to individuals for the sake of 
preserving societal function, 
“justification for such decisions should 
be drawn up in advance and publicized” 
(Gomersall et al., 2006, p. 1011).   
 
In addition to social role, the question of 
whether to include age in triage criteria 
has been addressed in several documents 
(AHRQ, 2007; Challen et al., 2007; 
Christian et al., 2006; Clarian, 2006; 
New York State Workgroup, 2007; 
OHPIP, 2006; Utah HHSA, 2007).  The 
Clarian (2006) document suggests that, 
if all other factors are equal, a younger 
individual should be given priority over 
an older individual because the younger 
has more potential life to lose or gain.  
The OHPIP (2006) method of addressing 
age, in contrast to Clarian’s, is not 
dependent upon comparisons with other 
patients.  Instead, it uses age as an 
exclusion criterion only if the age of the 
individual is greater than 85 years.  
Likewise, the Utah HHSA (2007) 
document does not use age to compare 
patients.  Instead, depending on the level 
of triage (level 1 is used in the early 
stages of the pandemic, level 2 is used in 
a worsening pandemic, and level 3 is 
used in the worst-case scenario of the 
pandemic), an age of 95 and over, 90 
and over, or 85 and over, respectively, 
may be used as an exclusion criterion.   
Challen et al. (2007) suggest that a 
scoring system be used that 
accommodates age, giving the patient an 
extra “point” if he or she is at least 65 
years old.  Other literature also suggests 
considering age in exclusion criteria, but 
methods of how to do so are not overtly 
stated.  Christian et al. (2006) write that 
although they did not include an age 
criterion in their draft, they “received 
both strong and consistent feedback 
from both expert and stakeholder 
consultations” (p. 1379) that an age 
criterion should be included.  
 
Those Rejecting Inclusion of Social Role 
and Age in Triage Criteria.  Letts (2006) 
states that “the potential ramifications of 
giving preferential treatment to 
individuals on any social grounds are 
disturbing” (p. 133).  The New York 
State Workgroup (2007) offers the most 
extensive discussion on the inclusion of 
priority groups and social worth in triage 
classification procedures, and its views 
are similar to those of AHRQ (2007).  
Ultimately, the groups reject 
prioritization using any criteria other 
than medical or physiological factors.  
The New York State Workgroup 
acknowledges that healthcare workers 
who become ill and require acute care 
will be unlikely to recover and return to 
their duties before the pandemic runs its 
course, making their preferential 
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treatment unproductive.  In addition, the 
group argues that the inclusion of all 
healthcare workers as priority groups—
such as morgue workers, ambulance 
staff, firefighters, etc.—would result in 
healthcare workers being provided 
ventilators and other medical treatment 
to the exclusion of all other groups in 
some locales and “ordinary” citizens 
consistently would be denied ventilator 
access and life-saving care.  This 
sentiment is echoed by Letts (2006) in 
that if social function is taken into 
account, “the socially disadvantaged in 
the community might be subject to 
exclusion and injustice” (p. 133).  
Furthermore, New York workgroup 
members “objected strongly to the 
appearance of favoritism, in which those 
who devised the rationing system 
appeared to reserve special access for 
themselves” (2007, p. 28).  They suggest 
that the public will hold decision-makers 
accountable for any protocol regarded as 
biased and inequitable, and any 
procedure that may be viewed as 
discriminatory will evoke a harsh 
response from the public at large.  
 
The New York State Workgroup (2007) 
also rejects the use of age as an 
exclusion criterion in their ventilator 
allocation protocol.  The group’s 
argument is based upon the idea that 
aged individuals intrinsically are more 
likely to suffer physiological 
derangement than their younger 
counterparts.  This increased risk will be 
taken into account inherently by the 
SOFA prognostic scoring system used 
by the New York group to determine the 
individual’s triage status.  Thus, age 
indirectly affects the likelihood of 
survival without being made an explicit 
factor.  AHRQ (2007) presents a similar 
argument, stating that “age may be 
considered only as it relates to 
underlying organ function and 
diagnosis” (p. 71). 
 
Included in the New York State 
Workgroup’s (2007) planning document 
is an acknowledgement of the difficulty 
of the removal of life support.  Because 
such procedures can be traumatic for 
both the patient and the attending 
physician, the New York group 
recommends limiting circumstances that 
would require such actions.  For this 
reason, the group rejects the idea of a 
universal “trial period” for ventilator use 
for incoming patients, as it ultimately 
could result in large numbers of 
extubated patients.  It also has 
reservations about removing a ventilator 
from a patient who is stable or 
improving in favor of a new patient with 
a better prognosis.  Instead, the 
workgroup suggests evaluation based on 
the SOFA score.  Patients on ventilators 
would be assessed at 48 and 120 hours.  
“Those who meet the criteria for benefit 
or improvement would continue until the 
next assessment, while those who no 
longer met these criteria would lose 
access to mechanical ventilation” (New 
York State Workgroup, 2007, p. 32).  
The Utah HHSA (2007) also 
recommends routine assessment of 
ventilated patients, but in contrast to the 
New York Workgroup’s (2007) plan, 
such assessments would occur daily.  
Hick et al. (2007) also stress the 
importance of frequent reevaluation of 
patients’ health status in order to ensure 
that ventilators are allocated to those 
who would benefit the most.  Any 
patients who are removed from life 
support should be given palliative care 
with the option of sedation.  Justification 
for extubation and sedation should be 
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documented (New York State 
Workgroup, 2007).  
 
It should be noted that the New York 
group’s suggested protocol aims to 
prevent the need for the inclusion of a 
“tiebreaker” in the event that two 
patients with identical SOFA scores 
present for medical attention.  It does so 
by recommending the adjustment of 
each day’s threshold SOFA score so that 
a few extra ventilators are always 
available in intensive care units.  For 
example, at times when relatively few 
patients are in need of intubation, the 
SOFA threshold may be set high so that 
the most severely ill patients—
individuals with high SOFA scores—
still may have access to a ventilator. 
When many patients are in need of 
ventilators, however, the SOFA 
threshold must be set lower, and those 
individuals with high SOFA scores no 
longer may be allowed access.  Though 
this protocol theoretically will eliminate 
the need for a tiebreaker, in reality it 
remains a possibility that individual 
hospitals may face rare instances in 
which a tie does occur.  How to address 
such an occurrence is not discussed in 
the New York document.   
 
Terminal extubation of patients in 
chronic care facilities is addressed in the 
New York protocol.  The group 
recommends that triage criteria not be 
expanded to include individuals in 
chronic care facilities, since such actions 
would “make victims of the disabled” 
(New York State Workgroup, 2007, p. 
29).  Should an individual from such a 
facility require admittance into an acute 
care facility, however, he or she would 
be subject to the same triage criteria as 
other acute care patients. 
 
Berlinger and Moses (2007) recommend 
the development of a method to review 
triage protocol “after it goes into effect 
to fix problems and prevent abuses” (p. 
5).  The New York State Workgroup 
(2007) includes such an appeals process 
in its triage protocol.  Appeals may be 
used, for example, when a clinician 
disagrees with a patient’s triage 
classification.  The group presents two 
possible methods for undertaking such 
an appeals process.  The first is for a 
committee to review the appeal as it 
occurs.  This could benefit individual 
cases, but it also may delay some from 
receiving care.  In addition, it could 
spark “explosive debate during a time of 
scarce manpower and other resources” 
(p. 36).  An alternative approach would 
be to have a daily retrospective review 
of all triage decisions in order to identify 
flaws in the protocol and to provide 
accountability.  In this situation, 
however, individual patient interventions 
would not be possible (New York State 
Workgroup, 2007). 
 
Recommendations 
 
The discussion provided in this 
document lends itself to three 
recommendations that IUCB believes 
would lead to the development of 
ethically sound statewide policies 
regarding triage implementation.  Each 
recommendation is followed by its 
justification and has been evaluated by 
an expert panel convened by IUCB. 
 
Recommendation 1: The Indiana 
State Department of Health should 
adopt a protocol similar to that of the 
New York State Workgroup’s (2007), 
which rejects the consideration of 
social role and age as triage inclusion 
and exclusion criteria in favor of a 
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system of allocation based solely on 
physiological prognosis.  This triage 
protocol should be applied to all acute 
care patients. 
 
This protocol is preferred for the 
following reasons: (a) it allows for 
public accountability by using 
quantitative and objective data, which 
are much more easily justified to the 
general public than are subjective “social 
worth” evaluations; (b) it facilitates 
uniformity of implementation, because 
the analysis of objective data creates less 
variation in triage decisions than 
subjective considerations would create; 
and (c) it is the only system of all those 
considered that logistically could be 
implemented on a statewide level.  The 
New York proposal relies on a 
prognostic scoring system based only on 
readily available physiological criteria.  
Scores can be calculated easily for all 
individuals presenting for consideration, 
and allocation decisions can be made 
centrally, based on the resources 
available at the time (e.g., ventilators or 
ICU beds) and the number of individuals 
above and below a threshold score for 
that time.  Threshold scores can be 
adjusted based on availability of 
resources.  
 
The adoption of a system similar to the 
proposal developed by the New York 
State Workgroup would, of necessity, 
require centralized allocation decision-
making.  This would include collecting 
real-time information about patients at 
risk, their SOFA scores, and resources 
available, and setting thresholds for 
triage up to several times per day.  Such 
a centralized decision-making process 
would take individuals on the ground out 
of the decisions and allow them merely 
to implement decisions made at the State 
level.   
 
Expert panel members emphasized that 
although the SOFA scoring method may 
be utilized for adults, there exists a need 
to develop a triage method for the 
pediatric population.  Any such method 
similarly should be based on 
physiological prognosis. 
 
Additionally, panel members expressed 
great concern regarding the omission of 
age as an inclusion/exclusion criterion.  
Members argued that consideration of 
age is traditionally accepted in triage 
decision-making and should not be 
disregarded.  Panel members also 
acknowledged that healthcare worker 
resistance likely would occur in response 
to not considering age in triage decision-
making.  This concern emphasizes the 
importance of communicating the 
rationale behind the omission of age and 
social worth as triage criteria prior to an 
influenza pandemic. 
 
Recommendation 2: The Indiana 
State Department of Health should 
encourage all acute care facilities to 
adopt a common procedure for 
addressing how to allocate scarce 
resources when two (or more) patients 
arrive at an acute care facility with 
identical prognoses and there are 
insufficient resources to treat all. 
 
We acknowledge the ethically sensitive 
nature of any tiebreaking criterion.  
Although this protocol is expected to be 
used only in rare circumstances, it is 
necessary for institutions to have in 
place a common policy for addressing 
these issues.   
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In the event that a tiebreaker must be 
used, we previously recommended the 
concept of “first come, first served” be 
applied, with “time arrived” being 
defined as the time the individual’s 
SOFA score is entered into the system.  
This will reduce the need to extubate 
those patients who already have begun 
intensive care treatment, thus reducing 
further psychological trauma for those 
patients, their families, and their 
physicians.  “First come, first served” 
also is an objective deciding factor, as 
opposed to the evaluation of social role.   
 
Expert panel members recommended the 
development of “multilevel” triage 
criteria to confront the possibility that a 
tie still may occur between patients after 
the application of the first tiebreaker.  
Suggestions for possible additional 
tiebreakers centered primarily on the use 
of alternative prognostic scoring 
methods, such as APACHE, but it must 
be acknowledged that this method 
includes age in its scoring methodology 
and therefore may conflict with our 
recommendation not to include age as an 
exclusion criterion.   
 
Recommendation 3: The State should 
advise all acute care facilities to adopt 
a common procedure to conduct a 
daily retrospective review of all triage 
decisions in order to identify areas of 
the protocol in need of improvement, 
which may become clear as the 
pandemic progresses, as well as to 
provide accountability.  This 
information should be reviewed at 
both the State and institutional levels, 
and modes of communication to and 
from these facilities and the State 
should be identified clearly in order to 
communicate any areas in need of 
improvement. 
 
Since an appeals process would be likely 
to interfere substantially with the system 
of resource allocation, we instead would 
recommend daily review of decisions by 
the central triage officials, with 
prospective, system-wide resolution of 
discrepancies that become apparent. 
 
Expert panel members believed that this 
review should occur at the institutional 
level as well as the State level.  It was 
agreed that data from each healthcare 
site and facility should be stored in a 
centralized database with the State.  This 
would allow review to occur at the State 
level and would likely help to identify 
necessary areas of improvement more 
readily than if the review were 
performed only at the institutional level.  
Alterations of protocol could then be 
made as needed. 
 
Application to the Points to Consider 
 
In our previous work, we developed an 
ethical framework entitled Points to 
Consider.  This framework was designed 
to provide guidance for those working 
through specific ethical issues and as a 
tool for assessing the ethical basis for 
proposed policy.  The Points to Consider 
contains seven points that IUCB 
believed would need to be addressed in 
any policy development if such a policy 
were to be considered ethically sound 
and acceptable to Hoosiers.  
 
Expert panel members were provided 
with the Points to Consider document as 
part of their deliberations but were not 
required to use it as their only guide. 
 
We believe that the recommendations 
presented in this TAD are consistent 
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with the ethical framework presented in 
the Points to Consider document. 
 
Table 3 below summarizes the 
applicable points and how they are 
addressed.
 
Table 3: Points to Consider Reflected in the Proposed Triage Protocol 
Ethical Point to Consider Applicability to Protocol 
 
Transparency 
 
The protocol proposes that the State educate the 
public about the developing triage guidelines.  
Ethical justification for triage criteria is enumerated. 
 
Public Accountability 
 
Objective decision-making procedures eliminate 
subjectivity and bias from the triage protocol.  As a 
result, allocation decisions will be able to withstand 
public scrutiny. 
 
Responsiveness 
 
The inclusion of an appeals process allows 
healthcare workers and the general public to voice 
concern and dissent.  Evaluation of these appeals 
will result in more effective and acceptable triage 
protocol. 
 
Proportionality 
 
Less drastic methods of preserving scarce resources, 
such as canceling elective surgeries, are 
recommended prior to the implementation of 
rationing procedures.  As need becomes greater and 
resources become more scarce, the policy’s 
inclusion and exclusion criteria become more 
restrictive, reflecting the severity of the situation.   
 
Reciprocity 
 
The protocol provides various means of support to 
affected individuals.  For example, those individuals 
denied access to scarce resources (e.g., ventilators) 
are provided other means of medical attention, such 
as palliative care, and those with emotional and 
psychological burdens resulting from the crisis (e.g., 
healthcare workers) are provided Psychological 
First Aid.   
 
Uniformity of Implementation 
 
The analysis of objective physiological data creates 
less variation in triage decisions than subjective 
considerations would create. 
 
Case Study Responses 
 
#1.  Triage criteria must be applied to all 
acute care patients, including those not 
presenting with pandemic influenza.  
The decision of who receives the 
ventilator should depend solely on the 
patients’ physiological prognoses, which 
are calculated using the SOFA 
prognostic scoring method.  Neither the 
ages nor the social roles of the patients 
should be considered in the decision-
making process.  Should any of the 
patients have identical prognoses, the 
Triage 
tiebreaker of “first come, first served” 
should be applied based on when each 
patient’s case was entered into the 
system. 
 
#2.  Review of triage decisions should be 
made daily at the institutional and State 
levels, and any areas identified to be in 
need of improvement during this review 
must be communicated quickly and 
efficiently between the State and the 
institutions.  The physicians’ concerns 
should be evaluated to determine 
whether a change should be made.  The 
physicians, however, should not depart 
from the protocol until such a departure 
is deemed necessary by protocol 
reviewers.
40 
Triage 
 
References 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2007, February). Providing mass medical 
care with scarce resources: A community planning guide [Electronic version].  
Retrieved March 28, 2007, from http://www.ahrq.gov/research/mce/ 
Arts, D. G. T., de Keizer, N. F., Vroom, M. B., & de Jonge, E. (2005). Reliability and 
accuracy of sequential organ failure assessment (SOFA) scoring. Critical Care 
Medicine, 33(9), 1988-1993. 
Berlinger, N., & Moses, J. (2007). Five people you meet in a pandemic—and what they 
need from you today. Hastings Center Report. Retrieved February 29, 2008, from 
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/pdf/Pandemic-Backgrounder-The-Hastings-
Center.pdf 
Burkle, F. M. (2006). Population-based triage management in response to surge-capacity 
requirements during a large-scale bioevent disaster. Academic Emergency 
Medicine, 13(11), 1118-1129. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Ethics Subcommittee of the Advisory 
Committee to the Director. (2007, February 15). Ethical guidelines in pandemic 
influenza. Retrieved March 15, 2007, from 
http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/phec/panFlu_Ethic_Guidelines.pdf 
Challen, K., Bright, J., Bentley, A., & Walter, D. (2007).  Physiological-social score 
(PMEWS) vs. CURB-65 to triage pandemic influenza: A comparative validation 
study using community-acquired pneumonia as a proxy.  BMC Health Services 
Research, 7(33). 
Christian, M. D., Hawryluck, L., Wax, R. S., Cook, T., Lazar, N. M., Herridge, M. S., et 
al. (2006). Development of a triage protocol for critical care during an influenza 
pandemic. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 175(11), 1377-1381. 
Clarian Ethics Policy Review Committee Working Group on Ethics in Pandemic Flu. 
(2006).  Pandemic influenza triage principles. Unpublished policy draft. 
Gomersall, C. D., Tai, D. Y. H., Loo, S., Derrick, J. L., Goh, M. S., Buckley, T. A., et al. 
(2006). Expanding ICU facilities in an epidemic: recommendations based on 
experience from the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong and Singapore. Intensive Care 
Medicine, 32, 1004-1013. 
Hick, J. L., & O’Laughlin, D. T. (2006). Concept of operations for triage of mechanical 
ventilation in an epidemic. Academic Emergency Medicine, 13(2), 223-229. 
Hick, J. L., Rubinson, L., O’Laughlin, D. T., & Farmer, J. C. (2007). Clinical review: 
Allocating ventilators during large-scale disasters—problems, planning, and 
process [Electronic version]. Critical Care, 11(3). Retrieved January 25, 2008, 
from http://ccforum.com/content/11/3/217 
Indiana Pandemic Influenza Community Advisory Groups. (2006, November 15). Report 
to the state health commissioner on the findings and recommendations of the 
pandemic influenza community advisory groups. 
Letts, J. (2006). Ethical challenges in planning for an influenza pandemic. NSW Health, 
17(9-10), 131-134. 
41 
Triage 
Levin, P. J., Gebbie, E. N., & Qureshi, K. (2007). Can the health-care system meet the 
challenge of pandemic flu? Planning, ethical, and workforce considerations.  
Public Health Reports, 122(5), 573-578. 
McGorty, E. K., Devlin, L., Tong, R., Harrison, N., Holmes, M., & Silberman, P. (2007). 
Ethical guidelines for an influenza pandemic. North Carolina Medical Journal, 
68(1), 38-42. 
Melnychuk, R. M., & Kenny, N. P. (2006). Pandemic triage: The ethical challenge. 
Canadian Medical Association Journal, 175(11), 1393-1394. 
New York State Workgroup on Ventilator Allocation in an Influenza Pandemic. (2007, 
March 15). Allocation of ventilators in an influenza pandemic: Planning 
document. Retrieved March 17, 2007, from 
http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/communicable/influenza/pandemic/ventilat
ors/docs/ventilator_guidance.pdf 
Ontario Health Plan for an Influenza Pandemic. (2006, September). [Electronic version]. 
Retrieved March 28, 2007, from 
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/providers/program/emu/pan_flu/ohpip2/plan
_full.pdf 
Rubinson, L., Nuzzo, J. B., Talmor, D. S., O’Toole, T., Kramer, B. R., Inglesby, T. V., et 
al. (2005). Augmentation of hospital critical care capacity after bioterrorist attacks 
or epidemics: Recommendations of the working group on emergency mass critical 
care. Critical Care Medicine, 33(10). 
Talmor, D., Jones, A. E., Rubinson, L., Howell, M. D., & Shapiro, N. I. (2007). Simple 
triage scoring system predicting death and the need for critical care resources for 
use during epidemics. Critical Care Medicine, 35(5), 1251-1256. 
Utah Hospitals and Health Systems Administration. (2007, December 7). Utah pandemic 
influenza hospital and ICU triage guidelines (Draft). Retrieved February 28, 
2008, from http://www.pandemicflu.utah.gov/plan/med_triage120707.pdf 
World Health Organization. (2008, May 28). Cumulative number of confirmed human 
cases of avian influenza A/(H5N1) reported to WHO. Retrieved June 2, 2008, 
from 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2008_05_28
/en/index.html  
42 
Triage 
43 
 
Expert Panel Members 
 
Charles Miramonti, M. D. 
Emergency Medicine 
Wishard Memorial Hospital Emergency Department 
Indianapolis, IN  
 
Michael Niemeier, M. D.  
Medical Director, Intensive Care Units 
Methodist Hospital  
Indianapolis, IN  
 
Robert Weaver, RRT 
Cardiopulmonary Department 
Hendricks Regional Health 
Danville, IN 
Vaccines and Antivirals 
Technical Advisory Document (TAD-03-08) 
 
 
 
 
 
VACCINES, ANTIVIRALS, AND PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
PREPAREDNESS: 
ETHICAL ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
TO THE INDIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2008 
 
 
 
Eric M. Meslin, Ph.D. 
Jennifer M. Alyea, M.P.H. Candidate 
Paul R. Helft, M.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Technical Advisory Document was prepared by the Indiana University Center for 
Bioethics under contract with the Indiana State Department of Health as a part of the 
project "Translating Ethics Advice into Practice: Public and Professional Outreach 
about Pandemic Influenza Planning in Indiana". The views expressed in this document 
are those of the authors and may not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for 
Bioethics, Indiana University, Clarian Health Partners, Inc., or the Indiana State 
Department of Health. 
44 
 
Vaccines and Antivirals 
About the Authors 
 
 
Eric M. Meslin, Ph.D. is Director of the Indiana University Center for Bioethics; 
Associate Dean for Bioethics and Professor of Medicine and Medical and Molecular 
Genetics at the Indiana University School of Medicine; and Professor of Philosophy at 
the IUPUI School of Liberal Arts.  
 
Jennifer M. Alyea, M.P.H. Candidate is a graduate student in the Department of Public 
Health at the Indiana University School of Medicine. 
 
Paul R. Helft, M.D. is Director of the Charles Warren Fairbanks Center for Medical 
Ethics at Clarian Health Partners Inc., Indianapolis, and Associate Professor of Medicine 
at the Indiana University School of Medicine. 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
The authors are grateful to Margaret Gaffney, M.D., and Katherine A. Carr for their work 
conducting expert panel meetings and for providing feedback on this document.  The 
authors also thank Eric Metcalf, M.P.H., of Indianapolis for his review of this document 
and Andrew Klatte and Stephanie M. Stscherban at the Office of Emergency 
Preparedness and Response, Indiana Division of Mental Health and Addiction, for 
providing us with a copy of the Report to the State Health Commissioner on the Findings 
and Recommendations of the Pandemic Influenza Community Advisory Groups. 
45 
 
Vaccines and Antivirals 
46 
 
 
In 2007, the Indiana State Department of 
Health contracted with the Indiana Uni-
versity Center for Bioethics (IUCB) to 
research and provide insight on ethical 
dilemmas that may arise in the event of 
an influenza pandemic.  One topic that 
was addressed was vaccine and antiviral 
allocation, which would be a necessary 
task due to a finite amount of these sup-
plies.  The original research was con-
ducted primarily through literature and 
policy review, and two recommenda-
tions were formed based on these find-
ings.  The resulting technical advisory 
document was presented to the State in 
August 2007.  Since that time, new lite-
rature has been produced on the topic of 
vaccine and antiviral allocation.  Be-
cause the area of pandemic planning and 
response remains a developing field, it 
was necessary for IUCB to revise pre-
vious documents and recommendations 
in order to reflect the most current think-
ing on the topic. 
 
As with the previous documents, a sig-
nificant amount of the research for the 
current documents was based on a re-
view of the most recent literature and 
policies.  In addition, expert panels were 
convened to determine the feasibility of 
implementing the previous recommenda-
tions as well as to refine these recom-
mendations.  Case studies were devel-
oped to be used as part of an instruction-
al tool, as well as to stimulate critical 
thought and discussion.  They represent 
real-world scenarios that may occur in 
an influenza pandemic, and it should be 
noted that the presented case studies may 
be applicable to several areas of pan-
demic influenza planning that are pre-
sented in the four technical advisory 
documents developed by IUCB. 
 
Case Studies 
 
#1.  A clinic has one remaining bottle of 
oseltamivir.  A married 34-year-old 
woman presents to the clinic with her 5-
year-old son.  The woman has been ex-
periencing fever, cough, muscle aches, 
and sore throat for 24 hours.  Her phy-
siological assessment reveals that she is 
eligible to receive treatment, a 5-day 
course of oseltamivir.  The boy shows no 
symptoms of infection, and his physio-
logical assessment reveals that he is not 
eligible to receive the medication.  The 
woman says her husband also is not 
showing signs of infection.  She requests 
that she not receive the medication so 
that her treatment can be given to her 
son for use as prophylaxis.  Who should 
receive the oseltamivir? 
 
#2.  A vaccine for the pandemic influen-
za has been developed but is still in ex-
tremely limited supply.  A 47-year-old 
pulmonologist qualifies to receive this 
vaccine.  He requests that his family also 
be vaccinated.  His wife is a healthy 44-
year-old who works from home.  His two 
children are 16 and 17 with no known 
immune system impairment.  The pulmo-
nologist states that he will not report to 
work without his family being vacci-
nated.  What should be done? 
 
Introduction 
 
The pandemic potential of the H5N1 
strain of avian influenza has created the 
necessity of comprehensive planning for 
resources and procedures.  Although 
H5N1 has not yet acquired efficient 
transmission between humans, evidence 
suggests that soon this may be possible, 
causing widespread transmission (World 
Health Organization [WHO], 2006).  
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Experts have projected that this strain of 
avian influenza has the potential to be 
comparable to the 1918 pandemic, caus-
ing approximately 180 to 360 million 
deaths globally, with 1.7 million deaths 
possible in the United States alone.  As a 
result, the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), the U. S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), and other governmental agencies 
have established pandemic preparedness 
as a top priority.  Included in those plans 
must be strategies for allocating vaccine 
and antiviral resources, which will be-
come insufficient to support the demand.  
A consistent, equitable, and well-
developed method for the prioritization 
of target groups for vaccination and an-
tiviral therapy requires detailed consid-
eration.  Presented in this document are 
several issues to be deliberated and ad-
dressed in the development of such allo-
cation priorities.  This discussion is fol-
lowed by recommendations for the Indi-
ana State Department of Health. 
 
The Issues 
 
A review of the developing literature on 
vaccine and antiviral agent prioritization 
(Barnett et al., 2005; California Depart-
ment of Health Services [CDHS], 2006a; 
California Department of Health Servic-
es [CDHS], 2006b; California Depart-
ment of Health Services [CDHS], 2006c; 
California Department of Health Servic-
es [CDHS], 2006d; Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention [CDC], Ethics 
Subcommittee of the Advisory Commit-
tee to the Director, 2007; Florida De-
partment of Health [Florida DOH], 
2004; Gostin, 2006a; Gostin, 2006b; 
Gostin & Berkman, 2007; HHS, 2005a; 
HHS, 2006; HHS, 2007; Minnesota De-
partment of Health, 2006; New York 
City Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene, 2006; New York State De-
partment of Health, 2006; Olson, Simon-
sen, Edelson, & Morse, 2005; Public 
Engagement Pilot Project on Pandemic 
Influenza [PEPPPI], 2005; Virginia De-
partment of Health, 2006) identifies four 
areas of agreement.   
 
These are presented in Table 1 below.
 
Table 1:  
Areas of Agreement Regarding Vaccination and Antiviral Agent Prioritization 
Issue Explanation 
Planning Establishing target group prioritization guidelines prior to the occurrence of a 
pandemic is necessary in order to prepare for the inevitable shortages of vac-
cines and antiviral agents. 
 
Implementation 
 
Policies must be implemented consistently to ensure fairness and equal op-
portunity for care. 
 
Transparency and public 
awareness 
 
Preparing and informing the community regarding how target groups are in-
tended to be prioritized during a pandemic will help to reduce civil unrest 
and may assist with gaining compliance. 
 
Flexibility of guidelines 
 
The epidemiology of an actual influenza pandemic may vary from what is 
projected.  Plans must be modifiable to ensure the most appropriate response 
and usage of vaccines and antiviral agents.  Changes in the production vo-
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lume of vaccine manufacture also may affect prioritization.  Technological 
advances in vaccine production and other innovations may require a revision 
of procedures.  Prioritization guidelines must be able to accommodate 
changes that result from these factors. 
 
 
Providing vaccines and antiviral medica-
tions will be a principal strategy in the 
response to an H5N1 pandemic, and a 
majority of the proposed expenditures in 
the federal influenza plan are devoted to 
these countermeasures (Gostin, 2006a).  
Within the $6.7 billion federal plan, $4.7 
billion has been allotted for vaccine 
stockpiling and technology development, 
and $1.4 billion has been allotted for an-
tiviral agents (Gostin, 2006a; Gostin & 
Berkman, 2007).  Allocation of these 
federal stockpiles has been predeter-
mined based on state population (HHS, 
2006).  However, in the event of a pan-
demic, there almost certainly will be an 
insufficient supply of vaccines and anti-
viral medications, and particular target 
groups will need to be prioritized (Gos-
tin & Berkman, 2007).   
 
 
The Approaches 
 
Vaccines.  Debates over which popula-
tions deserve priority in receiving vacci-
nations are directly related to the prima-
ry objective of vaccination.  Emanuel 
and Wertheimer (2006) put forth the ar-
gument that prioritization should be  
based on the “life cycle principle,” 
which favors early adolescents to mid-
dle-aged individuals rather than the very 
young or the very old “on the basis of 
the amount the person invested in his or 
her life balanced by the amount left to 
live” (p. 855).  In response, Wynia 
(2006) states that any plan that prioritiz-
es adults over young children is likely to 
be rejected, since parents would likely 
refuse their own immunization in order 
for their children to receive it.  Addition-
ally, prioritizing these age groups would 
still require further subgrouping due to 
the relatively large proportion of the 
population that fits into these categories.  
As such, other criteria would need to be 
considered.     
 
More commonly, debates regarding the 
objective of vaccination in pandemic in-
fluenza have centered on whether the 
primary aim should be to minimize so-
cietal disruption or to minimize morbidi-
ty and mortality.  Societal disruption can 
be described as a significant disturbance 
to the functioning of society (e.g., the 
cessation of essential services or the oc-
currence of severe economic distress).  
Proponents of placing top priority on 
maintaining societal function (CDC, 
2007; McGorty et al., 2007; PEPPPI, 
2005) would favor vaccinations for those 
“essential to the provision of health care, 
public safety and the functioning of key 
aspects of society” (CDC, 2007, p. 2), 
and as such, a “social worth criterion and 
its use is justified in these limited cir-
cumstances” (CDC, 2007, p. 7).  The 
CDC (2007) document does not state 
explicitly who would be considered es-
sential and recommends that policymak-
ers engage in a dialogue with all stake-
holders to make this determination.  The 
PEPPPI (2005) project elaborates 
slightly on which individuals would be 
Vaccines and Antivirals 
considered essential, such as those in-
volved in “maintaining homeland securi-
ty, utilities, food distribution, and com-
munications” (p. 19).  Only intended for 
policy guidance, neither of these docu-
ments contains specific prioritization 
lists. 
 
Documents and policies that favor mi-
nimization of morbidity and mortality as 
the primary objective of immunization 
and minimizing social disruption as the 
secondary objective do have similarities 
to those that favor the reverse.  For ex-
ample, healthcare workers are placed at 
or near the top of the prioritization list in 
nearly all documents and policies (CDC, 
2007; CDHS, 2006d; Engel, 2007; Flor-
ida DOH, 2004; HHS, 2007; Illinois 
DOH, 2006; Minnesota DOH, 2006; 
PEPPPI, 2005; Straetemans et al., 2007) 
regardless of which objective is favored.  
Medical personnel not only treat the af-
flicted but also come into contact with 
large numbers of individuals who are not 
infected.  Their vaccination, then, would 
allow medical care to continue and 
would slow the transmission of the virus 
throughout the population by preventing 
transmission from the provider to unin-
fected patients. 
 
Despite the consensus on prioritizing 
healthcare workers, agreement regarding 
other groups' prioritization is somewhat 
lacking.  Even among themselves, those 
who favor the primary objective of max-
imizing lives saved (CDHS, 2006a; Flor-
ida DOH, 2004; Illinois DOH, 2006; 
Minnesota DOH, 2006) have different 
methodologies and prioritization lists of 
varying degrees of detail. For example, 
although some plans have placed utility 
workers high on the priority list (Florida 
DOH, 2004), others have not due to 
these employees' relatively low risk of 
exposure or transmission (CDHS, 
2006d).  Debates such as this are the 
source of deviation between various 
proposed policies. 
 
The original U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services pandemic prepa-
redness plan (2005a) included an appen-
dix that described the recommendations 
put forth by the National Vaccine Advi-
sory Committee (NVAC) and the Advi-
sory Committee on Immunization Prac-
tices (ACIP).  These recommendations 
contained 21 priority groups categorized 
into four tiers, two of which were further 
divided into subtiers (HHS, 2005a).   For 
each tier and subtier, the NVAC/ACIP 
group provided rationale for prioritiza-
tion ranking.  These included statements 
regarding each priority group’s suscepti-
bility to complications from influenza or 
to that subgroup’s function in pandemic 
response efforts.  Several states (Illinois 
Department of Health, 2006; Minnesota 
Department of Health, 2006; New York 
State Department of Health, 2006; Vir-
ginia Department of Health, 2006) have 
adopted these previous HHS recommen-
dations directly in their plans, although 
many specifically state that such prioriti-
zations are considered part of a draft on-
ly.  The state of Florida differs from 
HHS and the aforementioned states in 
that it has developed its own recommen-
dations for priority group rankings (Flor-
ida DOH, 2004).  The Florida plan iden-
tifies nine at-risk groups and, similar to 
the HHS guidelines, provides a rationale 
for each group’s ranking.   
 
Though the earlier HHS document and 
the states that adopted its preliminary 
prioritization list provide reasonable ex-
planations for the rankings of the various 
priority groups, these explanations are 
provided by committee participants and 
49 
 
Vaccines and Antivirals 
may be considered subjective and not 
entirely transparent.  The state of Cali-
fornia, by contrast, appears to have the 
most original, most developed, and most 
transparent methodology for determining 
subgroup prioritization of any of the 
states researched.  The California guide-
lines consider the minimization of health 
consequences as the primary objective in 
the response to a pandemic, under the 
assumption that “focusing intervention 
efforts on reducing the direct health con-
sequences [such as death] reduces indi-
rect consequences (e.g., economic loss 
and social disruption)” (CDHS, 2006b, 
p. 15).  The minimization of societal dis-
ruption and economic loss also are iden-
tified as critical factors, however, and as 
a result, strategies presented are required 
to achieve all three of these goals.   
 
CDHS has developed a mathematical 
methodology to determine its prioritiza-
tion listings—the Decision Analysis 
Scoring Tool (DAST).  The department 
identifies DAST as a resource to analyze 
“multiple goals, criteria, and alternatives 
to develop an optimal prioritization 
scheme” (CDHS, 2006b, p. 14).  This 
tool takes into account seven criteria: 
risk of complication, risk of transmis-
sion, risk of infection, vaccine effective-
ness, whether the individual provides di-
rect response service, whether the indi-
vidual provides support response ser-
vice, and whether the individual pro-
vides essential community service 
(CDHS, 2006d).  DAST was distributed 
to individuals from several different 
groups so they could rank 69 populations 
on a scale of 0 to 10 on each of the pre-
determined criteria.  For all identified 
populations, CDHS has calculated the 
average scores for each criteria category, 
and the sums of these averages are the 
basis for the priority rankings.  This ma-
thematical method allows for clear iden-
tification of priority groups.  Should new 
epidemiological data become available 
that identify some groups at greater risk 
for infection or transmission than pre-
viously assumed, DAST scores and 
rankings then may be adjusted accor-
dingly.  Such elements of the California 
guidelines enable them to be compre-
hensive, yet remain flexible to allow po-
tential modifications that are necessary 
in the event of a pandemic.  Currently, 
essential medical and emergency re-
sponse personnel retain the highest rank-
ings in the priority list, and healthy 
adults who otherwise do not hold essen-
tial positions are ranked at the bottom 
(CDHS, 2006b).   
 
One limit to the prioritization list gener-
ated by CDHS (2006d) using DAST me-
thodology was that only 10 individuals 
were involved in the initial ranking of 
the subpopulations.  Though this may 
put into question groups’ exact place-
ment on the list, it does not alter the ef-
fectiveness of the DAST methodology.  
Gathering feedback from stakeholders 
from all facets of society would help to 
ensure that the resulting prioritization 
list would be acceptable to all who will 
be affected. 
 
In the time since the original version of 
this document was provided to the Indi-
ana State Department of Health, HHS 
has made available a revised version of 
its vaccination allocation plan (HHS, 
2007).  This document was “drafted by a 
Federal interagency working group 
whose members represent all sectors of 
the government” (HHS, 2007, p. 2) and 
included the input of stakeholders such 
as community organizations and busi-
nesses.  In contrast to other planning 
documents, this draft explicitly identifies 
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10, rather than two or three, objectives 
for vaccine allocation.  These are to:  
protect persons critical to the pandemic 
response and who provide care for per-
sons with pandemic illness; protect per-
sons who provide essential community 
services; protect persons at high risk of 
infection because of their occupation; 
protect children; protect homeland and 
national security; indirectly protect per-
sons who cannot be vaccinated; protect 
persons at high risk of severe illness and 
death; protect those who have essential 
economic functions; protect persons 
guarding our borders; and target vaccine 
to persons among whom it is most likely 
to be effective (HHS, 2007).  
 
To create the prioritization list, the 
working group members undertook a 
method similar to the DAST methodolo-
gy utilized in the California plan, which 
allows for the prioritization decisions to 
be more transparent and objective than 
in the original HHS (2005a) document.  
Members ranked the importance of the 
10 objectives of vaccination.  Then indi-
viduals from the HHS working group, 
the CDC, and academia were involved in 
rating populations in relation to their ful-
fillment of the objectives.  Weighted 
scores were calculated from each group, 
and the resulting prioritization lists were 
divided into four categories: homeland 
and national security, healthcare and 
community support services, critical in-
frastructure, and the general population 
(HHS, 2007).  Each category has indi-
viduals who are identified as highest 
priority (tier 1), as well as second and 
third highest priorities.  Some categories 
additionally have fourth and fifth priori-
ty tiers, and some also have a tier of “not 
targeted.” This tiered system throughout 
categories ensures that vaccinations are 
distributed throughout the categories of 
populations and will not favor only one 
group.   
 
In addition to the mathematical metho-
dology HHS has undertaken in its new 
prioritization list, pandemic severity also 
is taken into account.  The tier to which 
a group is assigned is dependent upon 
the severity of the pandemic, whether it 
be less severe, moderate, or severe.  For 
example, in a less severe pandemic, elec-
tricity, natural gas, communications, and 
water sector personnel are not targeted 
for vaccination.  In a moderate or severe 
pandemic, however, these groups fall in-
to the second tier of vaccination priority 
(HHS, 2007).  Public health personnel 
and inpatient healthcare providers fall 
into tier 1 no matter the pandemic se-
verity, as do pregnant women, infants, 
and toddlers. 
 
The new HHS (2007) plan and the Cali-
fornia (CDHS, 2006d) vaccination pri-
oritization scheme have their own 
strengths and weaknesses.  The Califor-
nia plan defines 69 distinct subgroups, 
whereas the HHS plan defines only 39.  
Given the expected scarcity of the vac-
cine, defining groups as narrowly as 
possible, as in the California plan, would 
likely be beneficial.  One weakness of 
the California plan is that it neglects to 
alter prioritization schemes based on 
pandemic severity.  This is accomplished 
in the new HHS plan.  Additionally, the 
HHS (2007) document classifies sub-
groups into four categories, which en-
sures that vaccine will be spread 
throughout the population and not only 
to the few groups at the top of the priori-
tization list. 
 
Both the HHS (2007) and California 
(CDHS, 2006d) plans identify mathe-
matically how a subpopulation fulfills 
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several criteria.  Though the DAST me-
thodology utilizes seven criteria and the 
HHS methodology uses 10, there is a 
great deal of overlap between the two.  
Only one objective from the HHS plan is 
novel to this document: to protect child-
ren.  The following table illustrates the 
overlap between the two documents.  
The HHS criteria frequently can be clas-
sified within the California criteria. 
 
Table 2: Comparisons between the California and HHS vaccine prioritization 
criteria 
California (CDHS, 2006d) criteria HHS (2007) criteria 
Risk of complication -Protect persons at high risk of severe ill-
ness and death 
Risk of transmission -Protect persons who cannot be vaccinated 
Risk of infection - Protect persons who are at high risk of in-
fection because of their occupation 
Vaccine effectiveness -Target vaccine to persons among whom it 
is most likely to be effective 
Provides direct response service -Protect persons critical to the pandemic re-
sponse and who provide care 
Provides support response service -Protect persons critical to the pandemic re-
sponse and who provide care 
Provides essential community service -Protect homeland and national security 
-Protect persons guarding our borders 
-Protect those who have essential economic 
functions 
 -Protect children 
 
 
From this, it is possible to create a com-
bined criteria list.  This list likely would 
include the seven original DAST criteria 
(CDHS, 2006d) and would add the crite-
rion of protecting children (HHS, 2007), 
provided that the definition of “child” is 
clarified (i.e., an age range is identified).  
Other HHS criteria can be considered to 
help determine the extent to which a 
subpopulation fulfills the DAST criteria.  
For example, when determining if some-
one provides an essential community 
service, that person’s role in protecting 
homeland security, protecting our bor-
ders, or providing essential economic 
functions are some of the factors that can 
be taken into account.  These functions, 
however, are not exhaustive and should 
not be considered the only essential 
community services. 
 
Antivirals.  Though vaccinations will 
most certainly play an important role in 
achieving pandemic planning objectives, 
it is generally accepted that a vaccine 
will unlikely be available in the first 
three to six months of a pandemic (HHS, 
2005a).  Because of this, use of antivir-
als will likely be necessary in order to 
reduce the impact of an influenza pan-
demic.  All policies and plans are based 
on the assumption that antivirals such as 
oseltamivir will be effective in limiting 
the effects of the pandemic virus strain. 
 
It must first be noted that no methodolo-
gy similar to California’s (2006d) or 
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HHS’s (2007) vaccination plans has 
been developed for antiviral distribution.  
This lack of a mathematical decision-
making model may compromise the 
transparency and objectivity of any plan 
that is put forth.  Nevertheless, national, 
state, and local plans have developed al-
location prioritization lists (CDHS, 
2006a; HHS, 2005b; Indiana State De-
partment of Health Pandemic Influenza 
Community Advisory Groups [ISDH 
CAG], 2006; New York City Depart-
ment of Health and Mental Hygiene 
[NYC DOHMH], 2006).  Additionally, 
several states have adopted the HHS an-
tiviral guidelines in their entirety (Ari-
zona Department of Health Services, 
2006; Florida Department of Health, 
2006; Virginia Department of Health, 
2006). 
 
Though many studies have attempted to 
predict the effects of different antiviral 
allocation strategies (Gani et al., 2005; 
Lipsitch, Cohen, Murray, & Levin, 
2007; Longini, Halloran, Nizam, & 
Yang, 2004; McCaw & McVernon, 
2007; Swaminathan et al., 2007), con-
clusions are based on a variety of as-
sumptions about the epidemiology of the 
illness and therefore cannot be used as 
the sole justification of antiviral alloca-
tion.  Because of this, differences be-
tween prioritization lists primarily are 
the result of differences in views on the 
purpose of antiviral use, whether for 
prophylaxis, post-exposure prophylaxis, 
or treatment.  Prophylaxis is the provi-
sion of antiviral treatment in order to 
prevent illness in individuals who may 
not necessarily have been exposed to the 
virus.  It may be used early in the pan-
demic in order to prevent the spread of 
the illness throughout an affected com-
munity (HHS, 2005b).  Post-exposure 
prophylaxis is the provision of the anti-
viral to individuals who are known to 
have been in close contact with an in-
fected individual, such as a family mem-
ber.  Treatment is the use of antivirals in 
individuals who have a documented in-
fection or exhibit signs of infection.  It is 
most effective if dispensed in the first 48 
hours of symptoms (HHS, 2005b). 
 
In its report on antiviral allocation, HHS 
(2005a) states that both treatment and 
post-exposure prophylaxis require a sin-
gle course of medications, for a total 
usage of 10 capsules.  In contrast, 
prophylaxis is expected to require at 
least 40 capsules, or four courses of me-
dication (HHS, 2005a).  Such use for 
prophylaxis may therefore quickly dep-
lete the antiviral stockpile.  For this rea-
son, the United States Homeland Securi-
ty Council (2006) states that if antiviral 
supplies are very limited, antiviral medi-
cations would be “reserved for sympto-
matic individuals who are at high risk of 
serious complications or death” (p. 106).  
If supplies are more abundant, “it may 
be feasible to expand priority groups and 
implement strategies to limit disease 
transmission” (Homeland Security 
Council, 2006, p. 106), such as in initial 
containment efforts. 
 
Not surprisingly, all researched plans 
place the highest prioritization on groups 
requiring treatment (HHS, 2005a; 
CDHS, 2006a; ISDH CAG, 2006; NYC 
DOHMH, 2006).  The HHS (2005a) plan 
identifies 11 priority groups, the first 
five of which are prioritized for treat-
ment.  Three of the remaining six groups 
are prioritized for prophylaxis, and one 
is prioritized for post-exposure prophy-
laxis.  The rationale for each group’s 
prioritization is provided.  For example, 
at the top of the list to receive antiviral 
medications are patients who have been 
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admitted to the hospital with influenza.  
The rationale provided is that this is 
“consistent with medical practice and 
ethics to treat those with serious illness 
and who are most likely to die” (HHS, 
2005a, p. D-21).  The New York City 
plan (NYC DOHMH, 2006) identifies 
the same 11 priority groups as the HHS 
(2005a) document.  The main difference 
between the two lists is that the first sev-
en groups in the New York City plan are 
prioritized for treatment.  The final four 
are then prioritized for prophylaxis.  In 
other words, all treatment groups are 
placed ahead of the prophylaxis and 
post-exposure prophylaxis groups.  The 
rationale similarly is given for each 
group.  Furthermore, despite identifying 
prioritization groups for prophylaxis, the 
New York City plan states that “all 
stockpiled antiviral drugs will likely be 
reserved for treatment purposes only” 
(NYC DOHMH, 2006, p. 189).  The 
ISDH CAG (2006) recommendations al-
so emphasize the use of antivirals for 
treatment purposes, but priority groups 
are not ranked.  Prophylaxis is recom-
mended only if supplies of antivirals are 
increased within the state (ISDH CAG, 
2006).  The ISDH CAG identifies age, 
medical necessity, medical effectiveness, 
and social utility as considerations in an 
individual’s antiviral allocation categori-
zation. 
 
The California plan (CDHS, 2006a) does 
not have the level of depth as the other 
plans and does not identify subpopula-
tions in detail.  However, the California 
plan does identify allocation strategies in 
the different WHO pandemic phases.  In 
phases 3, 4, and early 5, “lab confirmed 
cases, close contacts, high risk individu-
als, and exposed healthcare workers” 
(CDHS, 2006a, p. 129) are prioritized 
for treatment.  In late phase 5 and phase 
6, cases are to be treated with prioritiza-
tion given to healthcare professionals 
and public safety workers. 
Recommendations 
 
The discussion provided in this docu-
ment lends itself to three recommenda-
tions that IUCB believes would lead to 
the development of ethically sound 
statewide policies regarding vaccine and 
antiviral allocation.  Each recommenda-
tion is followed by its justification and 
has been evaluated by an expert panel 
convened by the IUCB. 
 
Recommendation 1: The Indiana 
State Department of Health should 
adopt a rank-order prioritization 
scheme similar to those developed by 
the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services and the 
California Department of Health Ser-
vices in order to develop a vaccine 
prioritization list.   
 
The use of such mathematical prioritiza-
tion methods, which are based on a va-
riety of criteria rather than simple sub-
jective rankings, allows for greater 
transparency and accountability to the 
public, as well as the consistent imple-
mentation of the developed protocol.  
Additionally, such methodology allows 
for flexibility and adjustment should 
new epidemiologic data arise.  It also 
may be distributed and calculated in In-
diana to adapt the prioritizations to the 
State’s unique needs.   
 
A possible method of combining the cri-
teria of the California and HHS strate-
gies was presented within this document.  
It is advised that the State define its sub-
populations clearly, similar to the me-
thodology of the California document.  
However, it also is recommended that 
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the State classify these subpopulations 
under the four categories described in 
the HHS document so as to ensure that 
vaccine is distributed throughout the 
population and not only to a few high-
ranking groups. The State also should 
vary prioritization based on pandemic 
severity. 
 
Recommendation 2:  The Indiana 
State Department of Health should 
adopt an antiviral allocation strategy 
that places greater emphasis on 
treatment than on prophylaxis.  Non-
pharmaceutical prophylaxis, such as 
the use of personal protective equip-
ment, should be emphasized. 
 
Given the limited amount of antiviral 
medications that will be available, use of 
prophylaxis in those who may not be in-
fected would quickly diminish the 
supply of antivirals at the expense of 
those who are infected and in definite 
need of medical attention.  Such a strate-
gy of prophylactic use would likely re-
ceive limited public support and may in-
crease unrest.  On the other hand, use of 
antivirals primarily for treatment would 
ensure that the maximum number of in-
dividuals would receive the medication.  
The emphasis on non-pharmaceutical 
prophylaxis would reduce the demand 
for antiviral prophylaxis and would limit 
the potential risks involved in extended 
antiviral use. 
 
Some expert panel members expressed a 
desire to have a triage scoring tool simi-
lar to the Sequential Organ Failure As-
sessment (SOFA) methodology, which 
would be used to determine which pa-
tients presenting for treatment would re-
ceive antiviral medications.  Time since 
the onset of symptoms would likely be 
one point of assessment, since those pre-
senting 48 hours or more after symptom 
onset would be less likely to benefit.  It 
also was suggested that a supervisor, not 
the treating physician, decide who does 
or does not receive antiviral medication 
so as to reduce the treating physician’s 
conflicting obligations. 
 
Recommendation 3: The Indiana 
State Department of Health should 
develop an educational toolkit regard-
ing the criteria by which the prioriti-
zation plan is developed.  This toolkit 
should be disseminated to county 
health departments, emergency man-
agement agencies, hospitals, physi-
cians’ offices, and other stakeholders 
in vaccine and antiviral allocation. 
 
In times of scarcity, a common approach 
to allocation is essential.  Each group of 
stakeholders should be confident that it 
fully understands the objectives of ISDH 
with respect to prioritizing vaccine and 
antiviral availability.  Therefore, each 
stakeholder should be briefed as to how 
ranking and prioritization will occur.   
 
Application to the Points to Consider 
 
In our previous work for the Indiana 
State Department of Health regarding 
pandemic influenza planning, we devel-
oped an ethical framework entitled 
Points to Consider.  This framework was 
designed to provide guidance for those 
working through specific ethical issues 
and as a tool for assessing the ethical ba-
sis for proposed policy.  The Points to 
Consider contains seven “points” that 
IUCB believed would need to be ad-
dressed in any policy development if 
such a policy were to be considered ethi-
cally sound and acceptable to Hoosiers.  
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Expert panel members were provided 
with the Points to Consider document as 
part of their deliberations but were not 
required to use it as their only guide. 
 
We believe that the recommendations 
presented in this TAD are consistent 
with the ethical framework presented in 
the Points to Consider document. 
 
Table 3 below summarizes the applica-
ble points and how they are addressed. 
Table 3: Points to Consider in the Proposed Prioritization Strategy 
Ethical Point to Consider Applicability to Protocol 
Transparency The inclusion of open communication facilitates public awareness of 
the prioritization policies and their implications. 
 
Public Accountability 
 
The inclusion of the public in the various levels of the policymaking 
process, as well as the inclusion of means of communication to the 
public, allows policymakers to address the public promptly regarding 
any complications of the guidelines. 
 
Responsiveness 
 
Public and professional input in the decision-making process, along 
with the presence of communication mechanisms, allows for the itera-
tive evaluation and improvement of the prioritization guidelines. 
 
Reciprocity 
 
Healthcare workers engaged in direct patient care and emergency re-
sponse personnel will be at highest risk of infection and are prioritized 
for protective equipment and vaccines to minimize their increased risk 
of infection and allow them to fulfill their duties.  
 
Uniformity of Implementation 
 
Development of vaccine prioritization groups at the State level via the 
use of DAST and HHS methodology allows for clear and consistent 
identification of priority groups. 
 
 
 
Case Study Responses 
 
#1.  The woman should be informed that 
the medication is to be used for treat-
ment only and that an assessment of her 
son’s health revealed that he did not 
qualify for this.  Additionally, prophy-
laxis generally requires four courses of 
medication, so the one bottle she would 
provide him likely would be insufficient.  
If the woman continues to refuse the 
medication, it should be saved for the 
next qualifying patient.  If she accepts 
the medication, the first dose should be 
given at the clinic so as to ensure she is 
the one taking the medicine and that she 
is not providing it to her son.  She should 
be informed of the potential complica-
tions involved in giving the child medi-
cation that is intended for an adult.  Ad-
ditionally, she should be informed of 
non-pharmaceutical methods of prevent-
ing transmission of the virus to her son 
and husband, such as frequent hand 
washing, isolating herself in the house-
hold, and allowing her husband to care 
for their son to the extent possible.   
 
#2.  Though the pulmonologist qualifies 
as a top priority for vaccination due to 
his occupation and direct exposure to pa-
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tients, his wife and adolescent children 
likely do not qualify in times of extreme 
scarcity due to their relatively low priori-
tization rankings and limited risk factors.  
The pulmonologist and his family should 
be educated on non-pharmaceutical ways 
to protect themselves from exposure and 
illness, such as proper hand washing and 
social distancing.  The doctor should 
then be encouraged to report to work 
given his specialized skill set and the 
needs of the community. 
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In 2007, the Indiana State Department of 
Health contracted with the Indiana 
University Center for Bioethics (IUCB) 
in order to explore the ethical dilemmas 
that would arise in an influenza 
pandemic.  The difficulties that would 
accompany management of the 
workforce in such a health crisis 
comprised one such topic to be explored, 
which was accomplished primarily 
through literature review.  In August 
2007, IUCB presented a set of four 
recommendations to the State to address 
workforce management issues that may 
occur during an influenza pandemic.  In 
the months since the original research 
was conducted, the body of literature 
related to such topics has continued to 
grow, with many perspectives presented 
in greater depth.  Because the area of 
pandemic planning and response remains 
a developing field, it was useful for 
IUCB to revise and amend previous 
documents and recommendations in 
order to take the most current thinking 
on the topic into account. 
 
As with the previous documents, a 
significant amount of the research for the 
current documents was based on a 
review of the most recent literature and 
policies.  In addition, expert panels were 
convened to refine previous 
recommendations and to determine their 
feasibility, as well as to develop case 
studies that could be used as part of an 
instructional tool for critical thought and 
discussion. These case studies represent 
real-world scenarios that may occur in 
an influenza pandemic, and it should be 
noted that they may be applicable to 
several areas of pandemic influenza 
planning that are presented in the four 
technical advisory documents developed 
by IUCB. 
Case Studies 
 
#1. A 42-year-old single father works as 
a custodian at a local hospital.    He has 
two children, ages 7 and 9, both of 
whom have developed respiratory 
symptoms within the past 24 hours.  Due 
to a shortage of janitorial staff, the man 
is called into work.  He refuses to report 
to the hospital in order to remain at 
home with his sick children.  He has no 
family members in the immediate area 
who would be able to care for his 
children in his absence.  Given that 
custodians are not subject to 
professional codes of ethics or 
obligations, how should the hospital 
respond to the employee’s refusal to 
report to work?   
 
#2. A hospital has begun stockpiling 
personal protective equipment for its 
employees.  When the influenza 
pandemic begins, the hospital only has 
enough supplies to cover half its 
workforce.  Neighboring healthcare 
facilities also have limited supplies and 
are unable to provide assistance.  What 
steps must the hospital take to address 
this situation? 
 
Introduction 
 
Serious outbreaks of avian influenza A 
(H5N1) have occurred among birds in 
Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.  
Although highly contagious among bird 
populations, the H5N1 virus is rare in 
human populations due to a significant 
species barrier (World Health 
Organization [WHO], 2006).  However, 
as of June 2, 2008, the number of human 
infections has continued to increase with 
383 reported cases, 241 of which were 
fatal (WHO, 2008).  While no efficient 
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human-to-human transmission has 
occurred to date (WHO, 2006), the 
underlying knowledge of the virus—its 
highly virulent nature, constant 
evolution and mutation, and the potential 
for transmission from migratory birds to 
mammals and humans—has raised 
global concern of a pandemic potential. 
 
The World Organization has recognized 
the potential of an influenza pandemic 
and have called for member nations to 
start planning for the next pandemic 
(WHO, 2005), which WHO refers to as 
“inevitable, and possibly imminent” 
(Barnett et al., 2005, p. 1235).  Some 
professionals have suggested preparing 
for a pandemic similar to the 1918 
“Spanish flu” that is estimated to have 
caused 50 to 100 million deaths.  A 
similar pandemic could cause about 180 
to 360 million deaths globally, including 
1.7 million deaths in the United States, 
with transmission of the disease lasting 
at least two years (Barnett et al., 2005). 
 
If such a pandemic occurs, it will require 
drastic, though temporary, changes in 
many areas of society, including 
hospitals, schools, workplaces, and other 
public service organizations.  In 
planning a response for such a 
pandemic, many decisions will have to 
be made both to contain and control its 
spread, and policies to guide decision-
making will require consideration of 
ethical issues related to workforce 
management, allocation of scarce 
resources, and minimization of societal 
disruption. 
 
This paper discusses the ethical concerns 
related to workforce management.  By 
“workforce” we mean all persons 
employed in the various occupational 
fields.  As such, this paper identifies 
workforce-related ethical issues and 
suggests relevant questions that 
policymakers should take into account 
when planning for an influenza 
pandemic response.  Finally, it provides 
revised recommendations to the Indiana 
State Department of Health that may be 
used in the planning process. 
 
It is necessary to note that although an 
influenza pandemic would affect the 
workforce indiscriminately throughout 
society, we will focus primarily on the 
healthcare sector and healthcare workers 
in clinical environments such as 
hospitals, outpatient clinics, and other 
organizations employing workers who 
care for patients.  We also will consider 
other workers, such as food service and 
janitorial workers, in these institutions.  
This focus is intentional given the direct 
impact on the delivery of health care to 
patients should these essential healthcare 
workers be unavailable to carry out their 
responsibilities.  Nevertheless, it is 
paramount to note that other non-clinical 
workers are vital to uninterrupted 
healthcare delivery (e.g., suppliers of 
drugs and medical devices). 
 
The Issues 
 
A review of current literature on 
workforce management (Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality 
[AHRQ], 2005; AHRQ, 2007; Barnett et 
al., 2005; Berlinger & Moses, 2007; 
Cole, 2007; Ehrenstein, Hanses, & 
Salzberger, 2006; Engel, 2007; 
Gomersall et al., 2006; Gomersall, Loo, 
Joynt, & Taylor, 2007; Gostin, 2006; 
Gruber, Gomersall, & Joynt, 2006; Hsin 
& Macer, 2004; Illinois Department of 
Public Health, 2006; Iserson et al., in 
press; Jan, 2007; Letts, 2006; Levin, 
Gebbie, & Qureshi, 2007; Lo & Katz, 
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2005; Martin, 2007; McGorty et al., 
2007; Morin, Higginson, & Goldrich, 
2006; Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration [OSHA], 2007; Payne, 
2007; Public Health Agency of Canada, 
2006; Qureshi et al., 2005; Reid, 2005; 
Rhyne, 2007; Tzeng, 2004; University of 
Maryland Center for Health and 
Homeland Security, 2005; WHO, 2005) 
suggests some areas of agreement.   
 
These are summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Areas of Agreement Regarding Workforce Management 
Issue Explanation 
Planning Planning for a response strategy to a pandemic prior 
to its occurrence is crucial. 
 
Involvement in policymaking 
 
It is necessary to include both the public and 
healthcare workers in the planning process in order 
to gain support for and compliance to the plan.  
Public and worker involvement also will help to 
cultivate ethically sound decision making.  
 
Prioritization 
 
Healthcare workers should be given priority to 
scarce protective resources, such as protective 
equipment and vaccines. 
 
We note that the agreement reached on 
these three issues is not surprising, since 
they can be considered uncontroversial.  
Other ethical issues may not enjoy the 
same level of agreement, including the 
following four additional issues: the duty 
to care in healthcare provision; sanctions 
for absenteeism; control measures; and 
obligations of other important 
individuals in the workforce. 
 
Duty to Care.  Healthcare workers and 
healthcare professionals are faced with 
the risk of being infected while 
providing care to both infected and 
exposed patients.  The level of risk is 
relative to the specific agent involved in 
the pandemic, which in most instances 
will be unknown, at least when the first 
cases are identified.  Since most 
healthcare professionals are bound by a 
code of ethics that obligates them to 
provide care to patients, the scenario 
above gives rise to several ethical 
concerns: what degree of risk is 
acceptable in occupational exposure?  
Should the obligation to provide care 
diminish with rising levels of risk?  Is 
there a level of risk at which the duty to 
care no longer remains (Reid, 2005)?  
How should healthcare workers balance 
competing obligations when they come 
into conflict, such as when obligations to 
family clash with obligations to patients 
(Hsin & Macer, 2004)?  Is the obligation 
to treat absolute (Morin et al., 2006)?  
Each of these questions speaks to the 
central ethical concern facing healthcare 
workers in a pandemic: the nature and 
extent of their obligation to care for 
patients, even when this creates a risk of 
harm to the healthcare workers 
themselves. 
 
Sanctions for Absenteeism.  The public 
will demand that healthcare 
professionals be held accountable for 
providing care throughout a pandemic.  
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However, enforcing accountability raises 
several ethical questions.  For example, 
should care providers be sanctioned for 
choosing not to treat infected patients in 
a severe pandemic, and should 
healthcare workers be reprimanded for 
choosing not to report to work (Hsin & 
Macer, 2004)?  Are there cases when 
absenteeism is acceptable, such as when 
a worker tends to an ill family member?  
What if a worker fraudulently claims to 
be tending to a family member when no 
such family member exists?  Some of 
the possible sanctions for noncompliance 
with one’s employment contract or 
professional duties to care include 
professional licensure revocation (Center 
for Law and the Public’s Health at 
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins 
universities, 2001) and imprisonment 
(AHRQ, 2007; University of Maryland 
Center for Health and Homeland 
Security, 2005).  Other forms of 
sanctions may include warnings; letters 
of reprimand; financial penalties; license 
suspension (for examples, see Indiana 
Code 25-1-9-9); or termination of 
employment.  Noncompliance with 
professional ethical obligations to care 
for patients always raises profound 
ethical issues in the normal course of 
affairs.  When extraordinary events 
arise, they may demand extraordinary 
responses, and institutions must exercise 
caution in the actions they take. 
 
Control Measures.  The State will be 
required to institute public health control 
measures immediately in order to 
contain the spread of the disease.  Some 
of the control measures may include 
quarantining workers in places believed 
to be exposed, such as hospitals, clinics, 
airports, and bus terminals.  These issues 
arose in the 2003 SARS epidemic in 
Asia and Canada, where quarantine was 
invoked in various workplaces (Hsin & 
Macer, 2004), and in the more recent 
case of an airline passenger who was 
initially diagnosed with extremely 
resistant tuberculosis and was placed in 
isolation upon his return to the United 
States (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention [CDC], 2007a; Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2007b).  
The principal ethical questions are: (a) 
whether quarantine should be ordered 
without warning or preparation, and (b) 
whether families of care providers 
should be quarantined after the provider 
has a documented exposure (Hsin & 
Macer, 2004). 
 
On the other hand, negative outcomes 
from quarantine, such as fear, 
depression, anxiety, anger, frustration, 
community isolation, and stigma for 
workers providing care to infected 
individuals, produce another set of 
ethical concerns: whether families of 
care providers should be prioritized for 
scarce protective resources; whether 
healthcare workers should be 
quarantined; and whether control 
measures should aim primarily at 
controlling the spread of a disease or at 
reducing societal disruption (Hsin & 
Macer, 2004; Reid, 2005). 
 
Other Vital Workers.  For healthcare 
institutions to be able to provide care to 
infected and exposed individuals during 
an influenza pandemic, other vital staff 
members need to be at work.  These 
include translators, cooks, hospital 
janitorial staff, and suppliers of critical 
resources, who are hourly employees 
critical to the daily operation of 
healthcare organizations.  In the absence 
of the use of accrued paid sick leave or 
invocation of Family and Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA) rights, a choice not to 
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report to work, for whatever reason, 
would result in these workers not being 
paid.  Thus, the main ethical concerns 
that revolve around reporting to work 
are: Should such groups of hospital 
workers, who do not have the same 
kinds of professional obligations as 
doctors and nurses, be expected to work?  
What should the consequences be when 
such workers do not report to work?  
Will the consequences differ depending 
on the underlying reason for absence 
(e.g., not reporting to work due to fear 
versus staying home to care for a sick 
family member)? 
 
The Approaches 
 
A number of approaches have been 
offered to address the ethical issues that 
arise for workers during an influenza 
pandemic.  We outline these below.   
 
Emphasizing Duty to Care.  As 
previously noted, healthcare 
professionals have a duty to assure 
adequate availability of care in 
emergencies, but some studies have 
suggested that as few as 48% of at-risk 
employees may be willing to report to 
work (Qureshi et al., 2005).  Others, 
however, have found that healthcare 
professionals recognize their 
professional obligation to treat patients 
in an influenza pandemic (Ehrenstein et 
al., 2006; Iserson et al., in press).  In 
their review of healthcare professionals’ 
responses to recent disasters, Iserson et 
al. (in press) note that emergency 
department physicians tend to have 
“rescue personalities” (p. 5) and 
therefore are likely to remain at their 
posts.  Iserson et al. (in press) also 
observe that religious values may 
motivate individuals to perform their 
work.  Additionally, these professionals 
may present to work in order to take on 
their own “fair share” of the 
responsibilities and not leave excess 
burdens on the shoulders of their fellow 
colleagues (Iserson et al., in press).  Fear 
of ostracism from their colleagues due to 
“abandoning their posts” is another 
potential motivator to avoid absenteeism 
(Iserson et al., in press).  The presence of 
senior-level physicians who remain calm 
in the situation and model appropriate 
behavior can further improve employee 
response (Iserson et al., in press).   
 
The debates that arose about healthcare 
workers’ obligations to assume risk 
during the early years of the HIV/AIDS 
era provide a useful comparison to the 
issues in pandemic influenza planning.  
In the context of treating HIV/AIDS, 
some commentators have argued that the 
obligation to provide care to infected 
patients should be inversely related to 
risk (Morin et al., 2006).  The main 
ethical concern was whether there exists 
a point where risk outweighs the 
obligation to provide care.  However, the 
experience in the context of SARS 
suggests that risk and obligation do not 
stand in an inverse relationship (Reid, 
2005); rather, the authors suggest that 
the greater the risk, the more obligation 
health professionals have to respond.  
Rhyne (2007) evaluated the American 
Medical Association and the American 
College of Physicians statements and 
policies regarding duty to care and 
concluded that “medical professional 
associations and societies support the 
safety of physicians, but also assert an 
ethical obligation and responsibility to 
work during a public health crisis despite 
personal risks” (p. 52). Letts (2006) 
argues that healthcare professionals 
should be encouraged to take on a higher 
level of risk out of professional 
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obligation.  Iserson et al. (in press) state 
that observing healthcare workers 
abandoning their duties would create a 
sense of panic and social instability in 
the public.  This is based on the 
argument that no one else in our society 
is “more appropriately trained and more 
deeply obligated to serve in [the] case of 
a medical emergency” (Reid, 2005, p. 
352) than healthcare professionals.  
Given their unique and specialized 
ability to provide care (McGorty et al., 
2007), if they do not tend to the sick, 
who will (Reid, 2005)?  Indeed, some 
even contend that vital workers must not 
only fulfill their current responsibilities, 
but are ethically obligated also to 
“assume new responsibilities for which 
they are trained, as long as their actions 
will not lead to greater harm than failure 
to act” (McGorty et al., 2007, p. 40).  
Nonetheless, despite many healthcare 
professionals appearing ready to take 
risk in care provision, other healthcare 
workers, such as health administrators, 
have been reported not to have the same 
commitment (Ehrenstein et al., 2006).  
 
It should be noted that a difference exists 
between ability to work and willingness 
to work (Qureshi et al., 2005).  Ability 
may be affected by logistical problems, 
such as barriers to transportation and 
child and pet care, and by health status, 
specifically whether an individual is 
personally affected by influenza.  
Identification of these specific barriers 
can lead to appropriate intervention 
strategies, such as establishing protocols 
to provide workers with child care 
(Qureshi et al., 2005). 
 
Level of willingness to work is reflective 
of the worker’s level of fear for his or 
her family, own health (Qureshi et al., 
2005), and professional liability.  It has 
been proposed that educating healthcare 
workers with information about the 
etiology of the illness and its proper 
control measures would increase 
willingness to provide care (Tzeng, 
2004).  It also has been suggested that 
some staff may be more willing to 
provide care if housing is provided so as 
to “avoid taking the flu home” (Martin, 
2007, p. 599).  In addition, the critical 
issue of ensuring protection from 
litigation for following protocols for the 
crisis situation may encourage 
professionals to report to work by 
helping to protect their professional 
status (McGorty et al., 2007). 
 
Much of current thinking focuses not 
only on the individual healthcare 
workers’ duty to care, but also on the 
duty of employers to ensure these 
workers are as prepared and protected as 
possible (Berlinger & Moses, 2007; 
Cole, 2007; Gomersall et al., 2007; 
Gruber et al., 2006; Illinois Department 
of Public Health, 2006; Iserson et al., in 
press; Jan, 2007; Levin et al., 2007; 
Martin, 2007; McGorty et al., 2007; 
OSHA, 2007; Payne, 2007; Public 
Health Agency of Canada, 2006; 
Qureshi et al., 2005; Rhyne, 2007), 
which will aid in sustaining adequate 
levels of workforce attendance.  Extra 
pay (Berlinger & Moses, 2007), 
effective risk communication and readily 
available information for workers 
(Iserson et al., in press), provision of 
counseling services (Cole, 2007; Gruber 
et al., 2006; Martin, 2007), adequate 
personal protective equipment (Martin, 
2007), and the availability of workers 
compensation (Rhyne, 2007) are all 
possible incentives and facilitators for 
employees to report to work.  
Developing explicit protocols and 
practicing response exercises and drills 
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also may increase worker attendance by 
increasing preparedness and confidence 
(OSHA, 2007). 
 
Sanctions for Absenteeism.  Although 
some argue that the choice of whether or 
not to report to work during an influenza 
pandemic should be an individual 
decision, others contend that the decision 
should not be left to individuals (Morin 
et al., 2006).  Nonetheless, there has 
been growing consensus that healthcare 
workers' choice to report to work should 
be voluntary (Ehrenstein et al., 2006; 
Hsin & Macer, 2004; Letts, 2006). 
 
Since absenteeism is a real possibility, 
planning for countermeasures in case of 
understaffing is recommended.  Some 
have proposed the identification of 
volunteers, such as retired physicians 
and veterinarians, prior to a pandemic 
(AHRQ, 2005; Cantrill, Eisert, Pons, & 
Vinci., 2004; Rubinson et al., 2005).  
These individuals could then be 
registered in a database for their quick 
retrieval and verification (Cantrill et al., 
2004; Rubinson et al., 2005).  Gomersall 
et al. (2006) suggest drafting of staff to 
work in intensive care units if sufficient 
volunteers are unavailable.  However, he 
cautions that this should be done before 
a pandemic in a manner that is “fair, 
transparent, participatory, [and] 
understood” (Gomersall et al., 2006, p. 
1009).   
 
As with the duty to care, approaches to 
sanctions for absenteeism and refusal to 
care vary greatly.  Regarding penalties 
for those choosing not to report to work, 
the survey by Ehrenstein et al. (2006) 
found that most healthcare professionals 
did not support sanctions for 
absenteeism.  At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, Maryland law requires 
healthcare professionals to report to 
work in times of medical emergencies 
(University of Maryland Center for 
Health and Homeland Security, 2005).  
One’s failure to do so may result in 
arrest (AHRQ, 2007).  Permanent 
dismissal from work remains another 
option, as was carried out in Canada 
during the SARS epidemic (Rhyne, 
2007).  Reasons for absenteeism were 
not considered when determining 
sanctions (Rhyne, 2007).  Also 
suggested as a form of penalty, the 
Center for Law and the Public’s Health 
at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins 
universities (2001) discusses the 
possibility of making a practitioner’s 
license dependent upon that individual 
assisting “in the performance of 
vaccination, treatment, examination, or 
testing of any individual” (p. 33) during 
a public emergency.  The Public 
Engagement Pilot Project on Pandemic 
Influenza [PEPPPI] (2005) suggests 
obtaining “commitments from 
vaccinated individuals stating that they 
will conduct the work for which they 
received the immunization” (p. 21).  
Sanctions then may be reserved for those 
who break these commitments. 
 
Letts (2006) proposes a middle-ground 
approach, where health professionals are 
neither coerced into providing care 
“through problematic notions of 
enforceable duties” (p. 133) nor are 
allowed to “withdraw care unchecked” 
(p. 133).   
 
There are substantial difficulties in 
assessing whether the reasons for 
absenteeism are legitimate among 
healthcare professionals.  What is a 
legitimate reason for not reporting to 
work? Family obligations?  
Overwhelming fear of infection?  How 
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can the system verify the reasons 
provided?  Will “verification officials” 
check on healthcare professionals and 
verify the excuses they provide for 
absenteeism?  Admittedly, these are 
complex decisions that require care and 
consideration. 
 
Control Measures. As control measures, 
isolation and quarantine of exposed 
individuals “are extreme measures that 
require rigorous safeguards” (Gostin, 
2006, p. 1703), especially in pandemics, 
which are known to be socially divisive, 
so that they are exercised fairly and not 
as subterfuges for discrimination 
(Gostin, 2006).  Researchers have 
proposed that individuals likely will 
quarantine or isolate themselves 
voluntarily (Engel, 2007), in which case 
government and employers would not 
need to exercise any such strategies.  
Forced isolation and quarantine, 
however, may be ineffective because 
most healthcare workers not only dislike 
mandatory control measures, but they 
also are more likely to fulfill their 
obligations during a pandemic in the 
absence of strict prophylactic quarantine 
(Tzeng, 2004).  Additionally, “in our 
global society with rapid international 
travel, traditional public health measures 
such as quarantine and isolation may not 
contain many identified illnesses” 
(Iserson et al., in press, p. 2). Still, some 
maintain that quarantining healthcare 
workers during a pandemic will be 
necessary (Gruber et al., 2006).  As Lo 
and Katz (2005) have argued, the need to 
protect the general public from serious 
illness is more important than respecting 
the individual’s autonomy.  Nonetheless, 
this “loss of individual liberty must be 
balanced by the demonstrable need for 
restrictive measures to protect society” 
(Gomersall et al., 2006, p. 1010).   
 
This need to protect society came to the 
forefront in 2007 with the case of 
Andrew Speaker, an individual initially 
diagnosed with extremely resistant 
tuberculosis (Conant & Wingert, 2007; 
WHO, 2007).  Few would disagree that 
Speaker’s isolation was necessary to 
protect the public against the risk of 
possible transmission.  Indeed, had the 
Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention put the patient in isolation 
immediately, he would not have exposed 
fellow airline passengers and others to 
this potentially lethal illness.  His forced 
isolation upon return to the United States 
prevented further possible transmission 
to other members of society. 
 
Actions Regarding Other Vital 
Workforce.  Few have commented 
directly on the issue of whether all or 
only “vital” healthcare workers should 
be subject to workforce management 
strategies, but the topic is increasingly 
being addressed.  Berlinger and Moses 
(2007) state, “It is never ethically 
appropriate to add to the burden of the 
most vulnerable members of any society.  
If low-status workers do not receive a 
fair share of their society’s benefits, it is 
not fair to tell them they have a 
professional or civic duty to do 
dangerous work” (p. 11).   
 
Not surprisingly, then, strategies for 
encouraging other vital employees to 
report to work are somewhat similar to 
those directed toward healthcare 
professionals, including providing 
family support (Iserson et al., in press), 
providing education about the pandemic, 
and conducting simulation exercises 
(OSHA, 2007).  Furthermore, 
emphasizing each worker’s importance 
for pandemic response will help to 
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encourage the individual to report to 
work.  Iserson et al. (in press) report that 
during the SARS epidemic in Toronto, 
many non-clinical employees failed to 
present to work because “they believed 
they were not valued or given important 
information” (p. 6).  It is essential, then, 
to create an environment that offers up-
to-date information and boosts morale.    
 
The AHRQ (2005) recommends offering 
protection to all staff and their families 
(e.g., providing prophylaxis) in order to 
ensure the staff report to work.  In 
contrast, Berlinger and Moses (2007) 
state that while providing incentives 
such as extra pay, child care, housing, or 
other similar benefits is recommended, 
offering vaccines to workers’ families is 
not appropriate unless those family 
members belong to priority groups 
themselves.  Because vaccine will likely 
be limited in supply, nonpharmaceutical 
methods to prevent exposure at home, 
such as frequent and proper hand 
washing and self-quarantine, should be 
emphasized.  Providing housing to non-
clinical employees, as with professional 
clinical staff, in order to reduce family 
members’ potential exposure to the virus 
is one possibility.  Cole (2007) and 
McGorty et al. (2007) state that all 
employees should be encouraged to 
develop a family pandemic plan in order 
to address any issues before a pandemic 
occurs, which would include stocking 
necessary supplies and coordinating care 
for family members. 
 
In addition to financial and service 
benefits, experts have suggested that 
staff be given “opportunities for rest and 
recuperation” (WHO, 2005, p. 40) 
between waves and at the end of the 
pandemic in order to decrease worker 
burnout.   
 
Recommendations 
 
The discussion provided in this 
document lends itself to four 
recommendations that IUCB believes 
would lead to the development of 
ethically sound statewide policies 
regarding workforce management.  Each 
recommendation is followed by its 
justification, as well as comments on its 
potential implementation.  These 
comments were provided by expert 
panels convened by the IU Center for 
Bioethics. 
 
Recommendation 1: The State 
Department of Health should work 
with healthcare organizations to 
identify and designate healthcare 
workers, both clinical and non-
clinical, deemed to be critically 
necessary during a pandemic.   
 
This recommendation is central to all 
workforce policy recommendations, and 
as such needs to be made centrally by 
the State.  A common list that can be 
adapted by institutions for their own use 
will ensure that all workers know their 
status and what will be expected of 
them.   
 
Mathematical approaches to prioritizing 
subgroups, such as California’s Decision 
Analysis Scoring Tool (DAST), are 
transparent and reproducible and have 
been developed for vaccine distribution 
strategies.  Such an approach could be 
expanded to apply to the identification of 
critical staff members.  The strategy 
would include clearly identifying all 
healthcare workforce subpopulations and 
scoring each on various criteria that 
would be considered “necessary 
functions.”  Staff members ranking the 
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highest on all criteria deemed 
“necessary” would be considered critical 
workforce members.  Please see our 
technical advisory document regarding 
vaccine and antiviral distribution for 
further discussion on DAST. 
 
Recommendation 2: The State should 
set and communicate the expectation 
that healthcare facilities should have 
adequate supplies of appropriate 
medical equipment (as defined by the 
State), prophylaxis, and related 
materials and that these institutions 
should ensure that these supplies are 
readily available to all critical 
personnel expected to interact with 
patients.  Healthcare organizations 
and facilities should be expected to 
inform the relevant county and State 
health officials of the extent to which 
they are able to meet these 
expectations.  The routes of this 
communication between the State, 
counties, healthcare organizations and 
facilities, and other relevant entities 
must be identified clearly. 
 
Since healthcare facility employees will 
be interacting with patients and thereby 
will be placing their own lives at risk, 
this recommendation recognizes that 
healthcare institutions have a 
commensurate obligation to provide as 
safe a work environment as possible for 
those workers who will be placing 
themselves at increased risk.  Since 
healthcare coordination in a pandemic is 
a statewide responsibility, it is 
incumbent on the State to ensure that 
institutions carry out these functions.  
Identified critical personnel should be 
given priority access to scarce protective 
resources, such as equipment and 
vaccines.  They must have adequate 
protection in order to protect the health 
and safety of the general public.  
However, the limitations and eligibility 
criteria need to be outlined clearly in 
advance.  Finally, due to workers’ 
tendency to resist isolation and 
quarantine control measures, these 
measures should be undertaken only if 
alternative approaches (e.g., voluntary 
isolation and quarantine) fail. 
 
Expert panel members emphasized the 
need for modes of communication to be 
clearly defined.  This will help to ensure 
that messages reach their intended 
targets as quickly and efficiently as 
possible.  
 
Recommendation 3: The State of 
Indiana and healthcare organizations 
should plan an influenza response on 
the premise of high expectations for 
workplace continuity for clinical 
healthcare staff.  Efforts should be 
made to provide detailed education to 
all healthcare workers, clinical and 
non-clinical, about the nature of 
pandemic influenza, and all should be 
encouraged to develop personal 
pandemic plans.  Professionals 
additionally should be informed of 
their professional ethical 
responsibilities.  Efforts should also be 
made to emphasize each non-clinical 
worker’s vital role in the pandemic 
response. 
 
Because verifying reasons for 
absenteeism would be practically 
impossible, we favor a “high 
expectations, no punishment” approach.  
By adopting a policy of high 
expectations, most healthcare workers 
will be encouraged to participate 
voluntarily in the response to a 
pandemic, thereby winning their 
commitment and compliance.  In 
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addition, efforts should be made to 
involve all stakeholders to the extent 
possible at various levels of the planning 
process before, during, and after a 
pandemic.  It is critically important that 
workers be sufficiently informed about 
the nature of pandemic influenza, its 
causes, modes of transmission, and risk.  
Members of a fully informed workforce 
are less likely to make inappropriate 
judgments about their personal safety. 
Furthermore, ensuring that each 
employee knows his or her importance 
to the pandemic response will help to 
boost morale and sense of obligation. 
 
It is necessary to identify who will be 
educating the workforce, when the 
workforce will be educated, and where 
this education will occur.  Possible 
actions suggested by expert panel 
members included making licensure 
dependent upon completion of pandemic 
influenza training or including pandemic 
influenza in new hire education. 
 
Recommendation 4: The State should 
provide guidance to healthcare 
organizations and facilities in the 
development of fair and responsive 
policies for reimbursement of 
employees, for developing incentives 
for presenting to work, and for 
determining sanctions for 
noncompliance with expected 
responsibilities.  Examples of topics 
these policies should address include 
whether some or all workers may be 
permitted to be absent; whether 
workers may use accrued 
leave/vacation time; and whether 
sanctions will be applied to workers 
who elect to be absent without 
acceptable reasons. 
 
Most healthcare workers have 
demonstrated readiness to fulfill their 
obligations in pandemic situations if 
they are in agreement with the policies 
adopted.  Listing “reasonable” and 
“unreasonable” justifications for missing 
work, as well as the practical 
impossibility of verifying reasons 
provided, causes us to favor a system 
that sets expectations for participation in 
the care of sick people high, and 
sanctions and other punishments low.  
Allowance of some absences but not 
others may prove to be problematic 
because of the difficulties involved in 
verifying the legitimacy of absentees’ 
excuses.  For example, it is recognized 
that in exceptional cases (e.g., a critical 
care nurse who is responsible for her 
own child at home), absence from work 
may be justifiable. 
 
Expert panel members emphasized the 
need to develop incentives for 
employees to report to work.  It was 
their concern that communication of 
high expectations would not provide 
sufficient motivation to take on personal 
risk for much of the workforce.  Panel 
members advised that a group of 
specialists be convened in order to 
analyze the feasibility and utility of 
various incentives.  Additionally, panel 
members were concerned that the 
sharing of employees between 
institutions and with alternate care sites 
would create reimbursement confusion.  
Convening a group of specialists to 
address this issue is recommended, and 
communication of findings on how to 
implement reimbursement strategies will 
be vital for the State and healthcare 
organizations and facilities.   
 
By encouraging a uniform set of 
reimbursement and sanction policies 
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throughout healthcare institutions in 
Indiana, the State would help to ensure 
the fair and consistent treatment of 
members of the state’s healthcare 
workforce.  This will help to maintain 
worker morale and encourage employees 
to tend to their respective 
responsibilities.  Ultimately, however, 
the decision of whether or not to adopt 
the State’s recommendations will likely 
rest with the individual institutions. 
 
Application to the Points to Consider 
 
In our previous work for the Indiana 
State Department of Health regarding 
pandemic influenza planning, we 
developed an ethical framework entitled 
Points to Consider.  This framework was 
designed to provide guidance for those 
working through specific ethical issues 
and as a tool for assessing the ethical 
basis for proposed policy.  The Points to 
Consider document contains seven 
“points” that IUCB believed would need 
to be addressed in any policy 
development if such a policy were to be 
considered ethically sound and 
acceptable to Hoosiers.  
 
Expert panel members were provided 
with the Points to Consider document as 
part of their deliberations but were not 
required to use it as their only guide. 
 
We believe that the recommendations 
presented in this TAD are consistent 
with the ethical framework  presented in 
the Points to Consider document.   
 
Table 2 below summarizes the 
applicable points and how they are 
addressed. 
 
 
Table 2: Points to Consider Reflected in the Proposed Protocol 
Ethical Point to Consider Applicability to Protocol 
Consistency of the Mission of 
ISDH and Other Healthcare 
Professionals 
The recommendation to involve healthcare professionals in the 
planning process will help to ensure that the protocol is supported by 
the various missions of the affected organizations. 
 
Transparency 
 
The inclusion of stakeholders in the decision making process, as well 
as the presence of communication mechanisms, ensures that those 
affected will be informed of the developing protocol. 
 
Public Accountability 
 
The inclusion of healthcare workers in the various levels of the 
policy-making process, as well as the presence of communication 
mechanisms, allows policymakers to address the workers promptly 
regarding any complications of the protocol. 
 
Responsiveness 
 
Healthcare professionals’ input in the decision-making process, in 
addition to the presence of communication mechanisms that allow for 
the expression of dissatisfaction by the healthcare professionals, 
allows for the iterative evaluation and improvement of the policy. 
 
Proportionality 
 
As personal risk increases, healthcare workers are able to weigh their 
own priorities to determine whether they will report to work.  They 
are to decide if the benefits of reporting to work outweigh the burdens 
of doing so. 
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Reciprocity Healthcare workers, who bear a large portion of the burden of caring 
for the afflicted, are prioritized for protective equipment and 
vaccinations in order to minimize their increased risk of infection.  
 
Uniformity of Implementation 
 
Development of workforce management protocol at the State level, 
the inclusion of healthcare professionals in the development process, 
and open communication will help to ensure that members of the 
healthcare field statewide will be aware of and approve of the 
recommended protocol, resulting in policy compliance.  
 
Case Study Responses 
#1.  Custodial staff members are needed 
to maintain as clean and hygienic an 
environment as possible to reduce 
further influenza transmission.  Prior to a 
pandemic, non-clinical employees, 
including janitorial staff, should be 
informed of the vital role they will play 
in a pandemic response.  They also 
should be educated on the nature of a 
pandemic and how to protect 
themselves, and they should be 
encouraged to develop a personal family 
plan for how to respond to the situation.  
The hospital should anticipate providing 
personal protective equipment.  
Nonetheless, if all recommendations are 
followed and the employee still is unable 
or unwilling to report to work, no 
sanctions or punishment are 
recommended.  The hospital should be 
prepared to implement a backup 
strategy. 
 
#2.  The hospital has an obligation to 
protect its employees.  Given its ability 
to provide adequate personal protective 
equipment (PPE) to only half its 
workforce, the hospital must identify 
“critically necessary” employees who 
will be expected to work and who will 
receive the PPE.  All others must not be 
expected to report to work given the 
excessive risk they will face.  
Additionally, the hospital must inform 
the State, through pre-established modes 
of communication, of its limited 
supplies. 
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With nearly 40 years passed since the 
last influenza pandemic, experts are 
warning that the next pandemic is 
overdue and that the H5N1 strain of 
avian influenza has pandemic potential.  
According to the World Health 
Organization, H5N1 “has met all 
prerequisites for the start of a pandemic 
save one: an ability to spread efficiently 
and sustainably among humans.”  As a 
result of this threat, international 
organizations, governments, health 
departments, institutions, and healthcare 
professionals throughout the world are 
currently preparing for a modern 
influenza pandemic.  Such preparations 
require a shift in priorities and 
expectations in medical care delivery 
and setting.  This includes the allocation 
of “scarce equipment, supplies, and 
personnel in a way that saves the largest 
number of lives in contrast to the 
traditional focus on saving individuals.” 
 
Several references for this document 
were found via the Indiana University 
Center for Bioethics website’s pandemic 
resources page 
(http://bioethics.iupui.edu/pandemic.asp).  
Others were found through searches on 
the PubMed database 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez/), 
the Web of Science database 
(http://scientific.thomson.com/products/
wos), the World Health Organization’s 
website (http://www.who.int/en/), the 
United States Department of Health and 
Human Services website 
(http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan), the 
Ovid Web Gateway 
(http://gateway.ovid.com), and the Yahoo! 
search engine (http://www.yahoo.com) 
using the terms “pandemic influenza,” 
“pandemic triage,” “avian influenza,” 
“triage,” “pandemic altered standards,” 
“pandemic alternate care sites,” 
“pandemic ventilator allocation,” and 
“pandemic law.” 
 
This document is not exhaustive of all 
possible resources regarding the topic of 
pandemic altered standards of care, but it 
is our hope that these resources may be 
of some use to those who are interested 
in pursuing the topic further.  This 
document is current as of June 2, 2008
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New York State Workgroup on Ventilator Allocation in an Influenza Pandemic. 
(2007, March 15). Allocation of ventilators in an influenza pandemic: Planning 
document. Retrieved March 17, 2007, from 
http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/communicable/influenza/pandemic/ve
ntilators/docs/ventilator_guidance.pdf 
The New York State Workgroup has developed a comprehensive plan to address 
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for the Canadian province of Ontario in the event of an influenza pandemic. It 
includes information on necessary public health measures that must be taken, as 
well as a detailed plan on how to maximize communication efforts. It provides an 
in-depth discussion on the identification and use of alternate care sites, stating that 
partnership in obtaining such sites is preferable over coercion and that alternate 
sites should be provided insurance. It also discusses the need to compensate 
healthcare workers for the disproportionate burden they may endure. 
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management of mass casualties during a pandemic. Discussion on use of alternate 
care sites and staffing methods is included. 
 
Qureshi, K., Gershon, R. R. M., Sherman, M. F., Straub, T., Gebbie, E., McCollum, 
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smallpox than in environmental disasters or mass casualty incidents.  Through this 
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They provide examples of how to redistribute healthcare worker responsibilities. 
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rapid accessibility. 
 
Tzeng, H. M. (2004). Nurses' professional care obligation and their attitudes 
towards SARS infection control measures in Taiwan during and after the 
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control measures and they were not subjected to quarantine.  This information 
may be applicable to the development of pandemic influenza response protocols 
regarding how to maintain adequate staffing during an influenza pandemic. 
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influenza plan, part 2: Public health guidance for state and local partners.  
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http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/part2.pdf 
This document aims to assist states and localities in pandemic preparedness 
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community planning. It also includes checklists that may help to guide emergency 
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use of alternate care sites and alternative staffing procedures. 
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document includes lists of steps planners should take in order to identify and 
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Retrieved June 5, 2007, from 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/avian_influenza/en/index.html 
This WHO document provides an overview of avian influenza, including 
discussion on its presence in birds and its history of human infection. It also 
provides a discussion on human epidemiology and symptoms. Finally, it identifies 
the nations currently affected by H5N1 infections. This document describes the 
potential of H5N1 to become the next influenza pandemic. 
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The World Health Organization reports 
that 383 human cases of avian influenza 
H5N1 have been confirmed, and 241 of 
these cases have been fatal.  With 
experts warning that an influenza 
pandemic is overdue and that H5N1 has 
pandemic potential, governments, health 
departments, healthcare professionals, 
and many others have been working to 
develop response plans for such a crisis.  
Those plans must include ethical 
strategies for allocating resources that 
become insufficient to support the 
demand, because “shortages of 
specialized staff, medical equipment, 
and supplies could limit the number of 
patients who can receive the appropriate 
supportive critical care interventions.”  
Such resource allocation strategies may 
be referred to as “triage” of scarce 
resources because they necessarily 
involve a prioritization of which patients 
will receive care when not all can.  
Consistent, ethically defensible methods 
for allocating scarce resources require 
careful planning and deliberation.  
Several references for this document 
were found via the Indiana University 
Center for Bioethics website’s pandemic 
resources page 
(http://bioethics.iupui.edu/pandemic.asp).  
Others were found through searches on 
the PubMed database 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez/), 
the Web of Science database 
(http://scientific.thomson.com/products/
wos), the Yahoo! search engine 
(http://www.yahoo.com), and the World 
Health Organization’s website 
(http://www.who.int/en/) using the terms 
“pandemic influenza,” “pandemic 
triage,” “avian influenza,” “triage,” 
“pandemic ventilator allocation,” and 
“SOFA.”  Finally, the Clarian document 
and the Indiana Pandemic Influenza 
Community Advisory Groups document 
were obtained from each group directly.  
 
This document is not exhaustive of all 
possible resources regarding the topic of 
pandemic influenza triage, but it is our 
hope that these resources may be of 
some use to those who are interested in 
pursuing the topic further.  This 
document is current as of June 2, 2008
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The pandemic potential of the H5N1 
strain of avian influenza has created the 
necessity for comprehensive planning of 
resources and procedures.  Although 
H5N1 has not yet acquired efficient 
transmission between humans, evidence 
suggests that soon this may be possible, 
causing widespread transmission.  Ex-
perts have projected that this strain of 
avian influenza has the potential to be 
comparable to the 1918 pandemic, caus-
ing approximately 180 to 360 million 
deaths globally, with 1.7 million deaths 
possible in the United States alone.  As a 
result, the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), the U. S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), and other governmental agencies 
have established pandemic preparedness 
as a top priority.  Included in those plans 
must be strategies for allocating vaccine 
and antiviral resources, which will be-
come insufficient to support the demand.  
A consistent, equitable, and well-
developed method for the prioritization 
of target groups for vaccination and an-
tiviral therapy requires detailed consid-
eration. 
Several references for this document 
were found via the Indiana University 
Center for Bioethics website’s pandemic 
resources page 
(http://bioethics.iupui.edu/pandemic.asp).  
Others were found through searches on 
the PubMed database 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez/), 
the World Health Organization’s website 
(http://www.who.int/en/), the United States 
Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices website 
(http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan), the 
Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion website (http://www.cdc.gov), and the 
Yahoo! search engine using the terms 
“pandemic influenza,” “pandemic tri-
age,” “avian influenza,” “pandemic vac-
cine allocation,” “pandemic law,” and 
“state influenza plans.”  
 
This document is not exhaustive of all 
possible resources regarding the topic of 
pandemic influenza vaccine and antiviral 
medication allocation, but it is our hope 
that these resources may be of some use 
to those who are interested in pursuing 
the topic further.  This document is cur-
rent as of June 2, 2008.
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The World Health Organization has 
recognized the potential of an influenza 
pandemic and have called for member 
nations to start planning for the next 
pandemic, which WHO refers to as 
“inevitable, and possibly imminent.”  
Some professionals have suggested 
preparing for a pandemic similar to the 
1918 “Spanish flu” that is estimated to 
have caused 50 to 100 million deaths.  It 
is projected that a similar pandemic 
would cause about 180 to 360 million 
deaths globally, including 1.7 million 
deaths in the United States, with 
transmission of the disease lasting at 
least two years.  If such a pandemic 
occurs, it will require drastic, though 
temporary, changes in many areas of 
society, including hospitals, schools, 
workplaces, and other public service 
organizations.  In planning a response 
for such a pandemic, many decisions 
will have to be made both to contain and 
control its spread, and policies to guide 
decision-making will require 
consideration of ethical issues related to 
workforce management. 
 
Several references for this document 
were found via the Indiana University 
Center for Bioethics website’s pandemic 
resources page 
(http://bioethics.iupui.edu/Pandemic.asp).  
Others were found through searches on 
the PubMed database 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez/), 
the Web of Science database 
(http://scientific.thomson.com/products/
wos), the World Health Organization’s 
website (http://www.who.int/en/), the 
Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention website 
(http://www.cdc.gov), and the Yahoo! 
search engine (http://www.yahoo.com) 
using the terms “pandemic influenza,” 
“avian influenza,” “pandemic altered 
standards,” “pandemic triage,” 
“pandemic absenteeism,” “pandemic 
alternate care sites,” “pandemic altered 
care,” “pandemic workforce 
management,” “medical professional 
obligations,” “pandemic law,” “Indiana 
medical standards,” and “tuberculosis 
patient.” 
 
This document is not exhaustive of all 
possible resources regarding the topic of 
workforce management during an 
influenza pandemic, but it is our hope 
that these resources may be of some use 
to those who are interested in pursuing 
the topic further.  This document is 
current as of June 2, 2008.
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